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ABSTRACT 
One result of the break-up of the Soviet Union is that the DOD has been 
forced to reevaluate the roles of each of the Armed Services based on the 
declining resource pool. From the Marine Corps' evaluation of itself came the 
C.ombined Arms Regiment (CAR) concept. The objective of this study was to 
develop an estimate of the Ufe Cycle Cost (LCC) of the two possible vehicles 
used with the CAR and the CAR's components. Standard cost factors are used 
to cost out the various organizations involved. 
Two supporting analyses done in this study are: an evaluation of the 
Marine Corps' role in national security and how the CAR could be used to 
support that security role, and a comparison of the vehicle option operating 
characteristics which was done to enrich the dimensions under which the CAR 
could be evaluated. The results of the study are a tool which can help Marine 
Corps planners make more informed decisions in regards to the CAR concept. 
The final conclusion, based on the assumption that any CAR would act as a 
follow-on element of the MAGTF, was that although the CAR(LAV) was a 
workable option, the CAR using upgraded AAVs was the better, more cost 
effective option. 
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As the United States continues the force drawdown of the 1990's, resources 
will be short in supply. This has forced the Department of Defense to 
completely reevaluate its programs and purpose. Each service has begun a 
complete analysis of its roles and missions to determine what the best force 
structure is to meet the new challenges of the future. For its part, the United 
States Marine Corps began a zero base review in August of 1991, directed by 
the Commandant and headed up by Lieutenant General Charles C. Krulak 
(then a Brigadier General). The Commandant charged a planning group under 
General Krulak to provide an executable plan that would attain the most 
effective and capable force for the Marine Corps at a size of 159,000 Marines 
(Thomas,1992, p.34). The review was to begin from scratch rather than simply 
evaluating alternatives to the current baseline structure. One outcome of the 
planning groups' efforts was the decision to field a Combined Arms Regiment in 
each division. 
The Combined Arms Regiment (CAR) is the focus of this thesis. The CAR 
has created many challenges and questions for the Marine planners. It is 
designed to be the first permanently standing mechanized infantry unit in the 
division. Its goal is to increase the mobility and firepower of the (now smaller) 
division. This exchange of manpower for technology is caused by the proposed 
159,000 man cap on the Corps manpower. Beyond increasing the tactical 
mobility of the division, which was the primary goal, little had been decided 
about the CAR. 
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Superimposed on the development of the CAR are issues that challenge its 
very existence. The first issue is what type of vehicle should be used to carry 
the infantry. Additionally, the Marines must be concerned with how the CAR 
improves their ability to perform their role and function in the national strategy. 
Questions have risen as to the geographic location of the world where it is 
needed. In fact, some Marines have begun to doubt the utility of the CAR at all, 
so the question of whether or not the Corps really needs it has come to the 
forefront. This research is organized to provide a background discussion and 
then develop a baseline operating cost for comparison of the possible solutions. 
B. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
The goal of this research is twofold, first to examine the need for the CAR as 
an organization within the Corps by looking at what capabilities it provides the 
Division, and second, to develop·a baseline operating cost for the CAR under 
certain organizational structures. This information will provide a foundation for 
Marine planners to begin the detailed and complex analysis that will ultimately 
decide the fate of the CAR. 
To achieve this objective, the role of the Marine Corps in support of the 
national strategy must be defined, at least in broad terms. Next, the ability of the 
CAR to support the Marine Corps' National Strategy role must be identified so 
that some measure of its value can be determined. Once this is complete, the 
analysis will focus on the proposed force structures for the CAR and the 
vehicles within them. From that point, a measure of the cost to operate the 
various organizations can be developed that will serve as a base for 
comparison. It must be understood that this document is only the beginning of 
research about the CAR and is not intended to provide the final answer to all 
these questions. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Basic information for this study was obtained from current publications and 
trade journals. Additionally, since the CAR is such a current concept, little of the 
detailed information about it is in writing. This required extensive interviews 
with program managers, action officers, and force planners to document most of 
the information related to the CAR. The historical cost data used in this report 
came from the Marine Corps Cost Factor·Manual and from supply officers 
associated with the operation of the various units that will eventually be 
associated with the CAR. The capstone information source for this report has 
beeh the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) whose detailed analysis have proven 
invaluable. It must be noted that most of CNA's final documents receive security 
classification due to some aspect of the report, for example, survivability. Yet, 
some of the information contained in a CNA report is unclassified and can be 
recovered if the researcher is willing and able to sort through the reports. Once 
the data was collected it was sorted and evaluated based on the author's 
profeSSional experience as a Marine officer. The bulk of this work is a simple 
comparison analysis of doctrine, vehicles, and structure options. Other analysts 
may develop different results due to their experience and different perceptions 
of the problems involved of those interviewed. 
D. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter I defines the problem and scope of research to be conducted and 
explains some terms. This chapter also provides a technical description of the 
vehicles compared in this study. Chapter II provides an overview of how the 
Marine Corps fits into the national strategy. Chapter II also discusses the CAR 
and its possible structures. Chapter III introduces the various aspects of cost 
estimating and the concepts used in this study. Also examined in Chapter III, 
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are the constant cost elements of the CAR. Chapter IV develops the Ute Cycle 
Cost of the vehicle options considered for the CAR in this study. Chapter V, 
discusses the additional capabilities that a CAR would provide the division 
commander. Finally, Chapter VI, provides a conclusion and recommendations. 
Appendix A is a glossary of commonly used Marine Corps acronyms. 
E. TERMS AND MAINTENANCE 
1. Terms 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps defines a service's ROLE as the 
broad and enduring purpose for the service which was established by 
'-
~, 
Congress in Law (Specifically Title 10, U.S. Code). FUNCTIONs are those 
more specific responsibilities aSSigned to a service through Executive orders 
which permit it to successfully fulfill its legally established role. A CAPABILITY 
is the ability of a properly organized, trained, and equipped force to accomplish 
a particular function effectively. The MISSION is the task assigned by the 
Secretary of Defense (Mundy, Armed Forces Journal 1992, p.S2). 
2. Marine Corps Maintenance 
Marine Corps maintenance is organized into three categories which are 
separated into five echelons. The categories will be explained first and then the 
echelons. Lastly, this section will discuss special concepts related to the CAR. 
The three categories of maintenance are, Organizational, Intermediate, 
and Depot. Organizational maintenance is performed by the unit's mechanics 
on its own equipment. It includes both scheduled Preventive Maintenance (PM) 
and unscheduled maintenance required to keep the equipment both 
operational and in good condition. Organizational maintenance is sub-divided 
into two echelons. The next category is Intermediate level maintenance. 
Normally, it is performed by specially deSignated activities in support of field 
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units. In this level, subassemblies and end items are replaced or repaired. 
Intermediate maintenance also has two echelons of maintenance. The highest 
maintenance level is Depot maintenance. Usually this level is performed only 
at Albany, Georgia and Barstow, California, the two Marine Corps Logistics 
Bases. Depot level maintenance has only one echelon and consists of major 
overhauls, and the rebuilding of parts, assemblies and end items. 
a. Echelons of Maintenance 
As stated earlier, the categories of maintenance are divided into five 
echelons. First and Second echelon maintenance are performed at the 
Organizational level. First echelon maintenance is user maintenance designed 
to be preventive in nature. It consists of cleaning, inspecting, and lubricating the 
equipment to keep it operational. Second echelon is the next step and is 
performed by trained mechanics. This is the first stage where corrective 
maintenance (CM) can be performed and also includes the regularly scheduled 
PMs. Most units in the Marine Corps have authorization to do first and second 
echelon maintenance with the battalion. In the intermediate level of 
maintenance are the next two echelons of maintenance. Third echelon 
maintenance is performed by designated mechanics as prescribed by 
maintenance publications. At this echelon, mechanics replace unserviceable 
components, perform very limited repair of components, and have increased 
diagnostic and test capabilities. Fourth echelon maintenance is usually 
provided by a combat service support element within the Force Service Support 
Group (ie., Maintenance Battalion). Mechanics at this level have the capability 
to do overhauls, rebUilds, and repair of major components. The highest level of 
maintenance is Depot which is also the fifth echelon of maintenance. These 
mechanics can perform any repairs not included in the other four echelons. At 
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the fifth echelon the major end item can be completely rebuilt or in many cases 
parts fabricated. Normally major end items such as tanks or Ught Armored 
Vehicles (LA V) will have one major overhaul at the depot level during a twenty 
year service life. 
b. SECREPs 
Another maintenance term the reader should be familiar with is 
Secondary Repairable (SECREP). These are components of major end items 
like alternators, carburetors, and starters. They are maintained in the 
maintenance float of the FSSG's Supply Battalion. SECREPs are removed by 
second and third echelon mechanics and exchanged at Supply Battalion for 
serviceable components. This system is designed to limit the down time of the 
effected major end item. 
c. Maintenance Within the CAR 
Many battalions in the Marine Corps only have maintenance 
authorization for first and second echelon maintenance, this includes infantry 
battalions. The other elements of the CAR are different in that the current tank, 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), and LA V units all have third echelon 
maintenance at the battalion level and first and second echelon at the company 
level. Often a mechanic has the same Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
for both second and third echelon work, so much of the time mechanics are 
pooled into one section to ensure optimal use and assigned to companies 
when deployed. Within the CAR, large pools of mechanics are also available 
from the regiment Headquarters and Service (H&S) company. For this research. 
it will be assumed that the mechaniCS will not be a separate third echelon shop, 
but be there to support the regimental headquarter's vehicles. 
Another important relation to understand is how maintenance is 
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budgeted. Currently, many units only keep track of repair cost for first and 
second echelon maintenance. Third echelon maintenance and SECREP costs 
are tracked and budgeted for by the FSSG. In effect, the operational units don't 
have to budget for third echelon maintenance. In this thesis, the Ufe Cycle Cost 
(LCC) is developed using a cost factor calculated by each battalion for the first 
and second echelon maintenance. This includes fuel, lubricants, and other 
stock items maintained within the organizational level of maintenance. A 
separate cost factor developed by the Deputy Comptroller at First FSSG is used 
to estimate third and fourth echelon maintenance and SECREPs costs. It is 
presented separate from the Lee developed for the eAR's units because the 
FSSG actually budgets and pays these costs. 
F. VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 
This section introduces the characteristics of each of the key armored 
vehicles involved in the CAR. It is intended to provide a reference point so that 
a better feel for the capability of each vehicle can be achieved. It also sets the 
baseline cost if available for each vehicle involved. 
1. M1A1 Abrams Tank 
The M1A1 has been the main battle tank of the U.S. Marine Corps since 
1991. (The A2 variant is currently the U.S. Army's main battle tank.) The M1A1 
has a four man crew and a 120mm main gun with 40 stored rounds. 
Additionally, it carries one 50 caliber machine gun and two 7.62 mm machine 
guns for use by the crew. The combat weight of the M1 A 1 is 126,003 pounds or 
around 63 tons. It has an overland speed of 41 miles per hour and a 309 mile 
range. There are normally 58 M1 A 1 tanks in a Marine Corps Tank battalion 
with an acquisition cost in FY93 dollars of approximately 3.4 million per tank. 
Presently, the two tank battalions each have 44 tanks, but for this thesis the 
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normal amount of 58 is used. Yet. it must be noted that the M1Al common tank 
production line has been shut down and would take at least 30 months to begin 
production again due to the over 18.000 vendors.involved. Since the Marine 
Corps doesn't have it·s full requirement for M1A1 tanks. it is attempting to buy 
old M1 A l's from the Army as the Army buys the A2. 
2. LAV 
The Ught Armored Vehicle family has had active units in the Marine 
Corps since 1983. The primary USMC vehicle is the LAV 25. which has a three 
man crew and a maximum capability to carry six additional troops or four 
combat loaded troops. It's combat weight is approximately 14 tons. The LA V 25 
is armed with a 7.62 mm machine gun and an automatic 25 mm Bushmaster 
chain gun. for which it carries 630 rounds. Its land speed is 65 miles per hour 
with a range of 427 miles. Although it is not surf capable. it can swim at speeds 
of 6.5 miles per hour in calm waters. The first vehicles were delivered in 1983 
and they are expected to have a 20 to 30 year service life. Currently. the 
Marine Corps has 758 vehicles in the following variants: lAV 25. LA VCR) 
Recovery. LA Vel) logistics, LA V(M) Mortar. LA V(C) Communications. and an 
LAV(AT) Anti-tank. It also plans to buy some Air Defense.LAV(AD). variants. 
A Personnel variant of the LA V is currently being used by the Canadian 
military. The Canadian vehicle is called the "Bison" and has similar 
characteristics to the current LA Vs. It looks similar to the present Logistic 
vehicle used by the Marines and will carry eight combat loaded troops plus a 
two man crew. Should the Marine Corps use LA Vs as the Armored Personnel 
Carrier (APC) for the CAR. it will be similar to the Bison in most respects. but the 
exact final configuration has yet to be determined. The acquisition cost for an 
LA V 25 in FY93 dollars is approximately $906.679 from the standard cost 
manual (versus the $1.1 million cost estimated by the program manager) and 
approximately $553,403 for a Logistic vehicle. Due to the competitive nature of 
the defense industry, no personnel variant purchase costs are releasable, but 
for the purpose of this analysis it will be set at $730,000 which is the average of 
the current Logistic variant which is most similar to the Bison and the LA V 25, 
which is the most common variant in the Marines. This assumption is based on 
the currently open production line for LA V 25's, and the fact that most of the 
Research and Development cost have been completed by General Motors 
Diesel Division, the present prime contractor. It is expected that both of the 
Light Armored Infantry (LAI) battalions within the CAR will have three LAI 
companies with four LAV 25's, 13 LAV(P)'s, 2 LAV(L)'s, and 1 LAV(R)'s each. 
3. AAV7 
This is the current amphibious assault vehicle, which has been in service 
with the Marines since 1971. All variants of AA V7 are in service with the 
Marines. This includes the Personnel, Recovery and Command variants. 
Presently, there is no active production line, and the last delivery was made in 
FY85. Should more vehicles be required, it would result in significant startup 
cost. The AA V7(P) has a three man crew and a maximum capacity of 25 troops 
or 18 combat loaded troops. The current upgunned AA V has one 50 caliber 
machine gun with 1200 stored rounds and one 40mm automatic grenade 
launcher. When combat loaded the vehicle's weight is approximately 26 tons. 
It's maximum land speed is 39 miles per hour with a range of 300 miles. In the 
water it has a speed of 8.4 miles per hour and is surf capable. The AAV has 
gone through some block upgrades and is now designated the AAV7 A 1 but it's 
service life is expected to end in 2004. Several more upgrades have been 
considered including the replacement of the suspension to improve overland 
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speed, replacement of the hull to improve water characteristics, and the 
changing of the armorment to a 30 mm automatic gun. These upgrades are 
only plans as the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) program 
moves along to develop a AA V replacement. The current AAV(P) replacement 
cost from the Cost Factors Manuel is $1,016,079 (FY93). 
4. AAAV 
The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle is the future result of the AM 
concept program. The current goal is to have an AAV in service by 2010 or as 
early as 2005. The AM V is to be a high water speed (20 miles per hour). high 
land speed (comparable to the MIAI tank), vehicle with increased survivability 
and firepower over the present AAV. Several models have been conSidered, 
and prototypes have been tested to prove the concept. The AAAV will allow an 
over the horizon (OTH) assault to be conducted by Marine Amphibious forces. 
Based on current information,and for the purposes of this study, the future 
AAAV will have characteristics as follows: It will have a road speed of 45 miles 
per hour, a three man crew, and capacity for 18 combat loaded troops. It should 
have a combat weight of approximately 32 tons and will be armed with a 30 mm 
automatic cannon with 375 stowed rounds. It is expected to have a unit cost in 
excess of $2.5 million. 
G. SUMMARY 
Chapter I has developed the thought process which this thesiS will follow. It 
has discussed both the method of research and the sources for information. It 
has also explained the goal of this research and how it will be achieved from 
the data available. Lastly, Chapter I provides an introduction to the terms used 
by the Marine Corps and describes the vehicles involved in this study. Chapter 
I is the foundation and road map for the rest of the thesis. 
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II. U.S. MARINE CORPS' ROLE IN NATIONAL STRATEGY 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE CORPS ROLE 
The 82nd Congress enacted Title 10, U.S. Code into law in the fifties and the 
U.S. Marine Corps' role in the support of the Nation strategy has been well 
defined since. But, the collapse of the Soviet Union has forced all the Services 
into a period of serious internal review and reflection. Title 10 has guided 
Marine Corps planners since the post Korean War days and clearly defined the 
Marine Corps size and mission. Title 10 legislates the size of the Corps to be 
three combat divisions, three aircraft wings, and other elements required to 
support them. The law also describes the Marines as a force most ready when 
the nation is least ready. It is a balanced force in readiness for a naval 
campaign and at the same time, it is a ground and air striking force ready to 
suppress or contain international disturbances short of large scale war 
(Mundy, Proceeding 1992, p.69 ). The ultimate goal in having this capability is to 
have a force that can rapidly respond to a crisis and then prevent its growth by 
holding the aggression in check while America mobilizes. What developed 
from this concept is the current Marine Corps force structure and philosophy of 
high readiness, mobility, and rapid response. 
In August of 1990, at Aspen, Colorado President George Bush announced 
the foundation for a new national strategy based on a changing world situation. 
The President directed a strategy based on the following corner stones: 
Strategic Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution. 
This was, of course, in response to the changing of the threat from a single foe, 
the SOviets, to a focus on regional areas of interest and many possible threats. 
The National Military Strategy of the United States specifically identifies a 
Marine Corps role in both Forward Presence and Crisis Response. Next, 
Military planners began to develop a base force concept to support the newly 
defined national strategy. One of the key documents from this process has 
been the "From the Sea" White paper. 
"From the Sea" was written by the Secretary of the Navy, Sean O'Keefe, in 
conference with the Navy's Chief of Navy Operations and the Marine Corps' 
Commandant. This document changed the Navy's focus from an open ocean 
"Blue Water" strategy to one that emphasizes forward operations in the littoral or 
areas closer to the shore. This isa deviation from the strategy of A. T. Mahan, 
which in general has guided the Naval service for much of the century, to one 
that emphasizes jointness, with a heavy lean towards expeditionary forces. A 
key point in "From the Sea" is its discussion of tailoring forces to the nation's 
need, which to the Marines translate into task organizing it's resources to 
complete the assigned task. This ability to build the required capabilities into a 
unit as needed is one of the cornerstones of current Marine Corps operating 
forces. "From the Sea" states that "Power projection requires mObility, 
flexibility, and technology to mass strength against weakness." These are of 
course foundational attributes of the current Marine Corps. The White paper 
clearly puts a very high premium on readiness, mObility, flexibility, and 
jointness. The first three attributes were directed to be vital qualities in the 
Marine Corps since 1952. It was the viewpoint of many Marines that "From the 
Sea" only reinforced the ideas and concepts already found tn the Marine Corps. 
It was wrongly hoped that the Marines' core philosophies and qualities, would 
protect the Marine Corps from much of the pain of the force reductions. In reality 
the force reduction became much deeper than had been expected. It quickly 
became clear that simply reducing the size of the Marine Corps and doing 
business the same old way was impractical. 
B. THE RESTRUCTURING 
Without the benefit of a single clear potential threat to justify the services 
existences, and with the U.S. Congress pressing for a force reduction, the 
Commandant, General C.E. Mundy, Jr., began the restructuring process in 
August of 1991. The first step of the plan occurred during the senior officer 
retreat where the Marine Corps' leaders discussed ways to keep the force 
relevant, ready, and capable while conducting the force drawdown. From 
these discussions, two groups were formed, one active duty and one reserve, to 
conduct the review and build the new Marine Corps force structure. 
1. The Force Structure Planning Groups 
These two groups became the Force Structure .Planning Groups (FSPG) 
and moved on to the next step. General Mundy gave the groups several 
specific guidelines to follow; 
1. Define the most effective force at the expected 159,000 man level. 
2 Maintain the Title 10 provisions and structure. 
3. Ensure the MAGTF concepts are maintained. 
4. Be able to field a joint task headquarters. (Krulak, 1992, p.15) 
During the eight week review, the FSPG 's determined that, even with the . 
changing world situation, a need still existed for an expeditionary, combined 
arms force like the Marines. As a result of the Commandants guidance and the 
above stated feeling, the FSPG decided to build a force that continued the 
traditional strengths of the Marine Corps vise develop new capabilities. The 
restructuring was done as a zero-based review rather than simply piecing 
together men and equipment to meet the fiscal constraints. Once the 
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restructuring plan was developed, it was presented to sixty-five of the total 
seventy general officers to gather their feedback about assumptions made and 
to validate the recommendations. 
The last steps of the restructuring were briefing the plan to Washington 
planners and then implementing the plan. Two things were made clear to the 
national leadership: capabilities would be lost as the size of the Corps was 
reduced, and the operating tempo would increase. In December of 1991, 
General Mundy approved the plan as the blueprint for the future Marine Corps. 
The plan's time table was set to conform to the six year cycle of the Future Year 
Defense Plan (FYDP) of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) used by the Department of Defense. 
2. The Restructuring Plan 
The restructuring plan touches every aspect of the Marine Corps' 
organization and it has far reaching effects to every level of the force structure. 
The forces that make up the Marine Corps fall into two major groups Fleet 
Marine Force (FMF) and non-FMF. FMF units are the operating forces available 
for deployment to meet a world crisis. They are the combat and combat support 
units that are the Marines fighting capability. non-FMF units are the supporting 
establishment which provides services ranging from training to recruiting. 
These forces are not available or considered when building deployable Marine 
Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). The plan looked at the Non-FMF force 
structure to see if any of the overhead costs of the Marines could be reduced. 
The non-FMF force structure was defined to include the following; 
1. Marine Security Guard Battalion (provide embassy security) 
2. Marine Corps Security Forces (barracks and sea duty Marines) 
3. Marine Support Battalion (national level intelligence support) 
4. Presidential and National Level Support 
5. External Billets 
6. Training Establishments 
7. Bases and Stations 
8. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command (MCCDC), Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSYSCOM) 
9. Recruiting 
10. Active Force with Selective Marine Corps' Reserve (Krulak, 1992, p.16) 
In all, the non-FMF manning was about 46,000 Marines out of the total 
159,000 Marines left after the expected force reduction. These non-FMF 
organizations were cut to the bare operating minimum to allow more room for 
FMF units, which are the heart of deployable Marine forces. The three Marine 
Aircraft Wings (MAW), which provide the assets for the Air Combat Element 
(ACE) were reduced from a notional size of 14,000 Marines to 12,000 each. 
The two CONUS-based Force Service Support Groups (FSSG) which provide 
the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) for the Marines was to remain at 
about 8,000 troops while the third FSSG will go from battalion size units to 
company size units. The three Marine Divisions will drop from a notional 
17,300 Marines to around 14,000 each. One of the major changes in the future 
division is the establishment of a Combined Arms Regiment as a means of 
providing greater lethality, mobility, and combat flexibility for the division 
commander in the smaller division. (Krulak,1992, p.17) The Combined Arms 
Regiment (CAR) is to have the existing divisional tank battalion, two light 
armored infantry battalions, and a Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) 
Company, (which is structured the same as those currently in the Ught Armored 
Reconnaissance Battalion) under one regimental headquarters. This is the first 
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standing mechanized infantry unit for the Marine Corps and the focus for the 
rest of this study. 
C. THE COMBINED ARMS REGIMENT (CAR) 
The CAR is a concept at this point. which is hoped to increase both the 
mobility and firepower of the smaller Marine division in a mid to high intensity 
conflict. It's roots come from the Corps' belief that it's total end strength would 
be capped at 159,000 Marines. The 159,000 man Marine Corps would require 
the reduction of several battalion size units form the division's force structure. 
The original planning would place one CAR in each division, or at least one 
per coast. It would replace the three infantry battalions of a current regiment, 
removing one completely and leaving the other two with slightly smaller 
personnel strengths. The smaller battalions would be mounted in Infantry 
Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) or Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) to increase 
mObility, firepower, and survivability. Additionally, the division's tank assets 
would be grouped under the CAR's commander to monopolize on the synergy 
of armored vehicles in combat. It was also accepted that the APC crews would 
be organic to the infantry unit to develop close relationships for both training 
and combat. This organization is unique because traditionally Marines task 
organize themselves into MAGTFs to fit the needs of the situations. 
As the concept of the CAR matured and more detailed analYSis was 
performed, several problems emerged. First, what should the APC be for the 
CAR, the originally suggested LA V or the AAV which was already the division's 
APC. Second, bow would the CAR be deployed since amphibious assault lift 
was decreasing and no provisions were made to allow space for a CAR on the 
current Maritime Preposition Force (MPF). Third, was it necessary to have both 
CAR's structures be mirror images of each other. This problem is influenced by 
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both the declining resource pool and decreased availability of amphibious lift. 
Lastly, should the tank battalion be maintained as a general support asset for 
the division as is the current practice? To understand this idea it must first be 
understood that Marine units are either in director general support status. 
Direct support is when a unit is assigned to support one other un'it as its regular 
function. Artillery units are examples. General support is used due to the 
limited resources available to a division commander where some of the 
battalions are not directly assigned to support an infantry unit. The Tank 
battalion, Combat Engineer battalion, Amphibious Assault battalion, and Light 
Armored Reconnaissance battalion are all examples of units in general support 
of the division. These units are task organized by the division or MAGTF 
commander to fit the need of the supported infantry or scheme of maneuver. 
The CAR provides both heavy punch and highly mobile infantry, giving the 
division commander additional battlefield options. Simply defined, the CAR's 
mission is to fight to a decisive conclusion with the enemy. It will have the ability 
to attack, seize, and defend any objective aSSigned to it by the division 
commander. It will not act like a Army Armored Calvary Regiment whose 
primary mission is to screen the main force by holding the enemy at bay. 
Additionally, its units will be built upon rather than be building blocks for the 
MAGTF. What remains to be determined is if the CAR will be the initial 
amphibious assault or if it will land at some time after the initial assault. The 
CAR's ability to perform an amphibious assault is a function of the shipping 
available and the vehicles within the CAR. This analysis focuses on the vehicle 
selection as that will determine what shipping program the Navy should pursue 
to support the Marines. 
Several options have been looked at for the CAR's structure but currently 
only three remain. The CAR(LA V) has the personnel carrier variant of the LA V 
as the infantry's APC. The next option is the CAR (AAV to AAA V) which uses 
the current amphibious assault vehicle (AA V7P) as the APC which would then 
be replaced by the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) when it 
enters service around the year 2010. 
The last option is to have a Ught Armored Infantry (LAI) Regiment instead of 
a CAR. This organization would have no tanks but would have two LAV 
mounted infantry battalions and a LAR company. This last option will not be 
specifically addressed in this report, but it does fit the amphibious lift constraint 
as a follow-on echelon because of the required additional assets required for 
ship to shore movement. This LAI Regiment could easily formed into a MAGTF 
but would require attachments. Additionally, this organization is still not 
compatible with the present MPF.load plans. 
D. THREAT DESCRIPTION 
In 1989, the Marine Corps Intelligence and Warfighting Center evaluated 69 
countries as potential areas for the future operations. A summary of the results 
of this evaluation as reported by R. D. Steele follows. The terrain in these 
countries was found to be equally divided into mountains, desert, jungle, and 
urban environment. Only about 60% had limited roads, and the average 
bridges were rated at 30 tons or less. Only 50% of the countries had usable 
ports, and there exists a significant shortage of usable military quality maps. 
Yet, even the countries with little infrastructure had capable militaries. On the 
average, the Marines could be expected to face trained infantry with modern 
armor and artillery. They also should expect the country to have high 
performance aircraft with stand-off munition capabilities. Lastly, the average 
line of sight for direct fire weapons was determined to be only 1000 meters. 
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From Steele's summary it is clear that Marine forces will have to be both highly 
mobile and very survivable. The Marines must anticipate that whatever vehicle 
they use, it should be light (30 tons or less) and capable of cross terrain 
movement. (All wheel drive or tracked). Additionally, if the vehicle cannot move 
itself from ship to shore, then the ships must have sufficient capability to off load 
them in stream. This becomes a serious consideration when the equipment is 
loaded on civilian shipping which normally does not have that capability (MPF 
shipping has limited in stream capability). 
E. SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps continues to view itself as the Nation's force in readiness. 
The evaluation of the national strategy and the Marine Corps' role point to a 
future Marine Corps that is quickly deployable to any area of the world. A 
Marine Corps that must be capable of clearing the way for more assets or 
providing a stilling effect to a crisis. The Marines will be the Nation's 9 1 1 
emergency service that provides a forward presence against a capable hostile 
foe where ever that may be (MundY,1993, p.13). 
To do this, the Corps will have to stick to what it does best, building MAGTF's 
to fit the crisis and task at hand or task organizing the Marines operating forces. 
The components will need to be both light and flexible while able to fight a 
decisive battle. The Marines must follow the expectation of Title 10, and "From 
the Sea" by providing the Nation a fighting force that has strategic agility. Able 
to quickly move anywhere on the globe in an expeditious manner and fill the 
task assigned by the President as he requires. To do this the equipment must 
be compatible with available shipping and airlift. Once they get to the mission 
area this same equipment must be able to stand-Up quickly and provide a 
strong enough deterrence to extinguish the fire without repressing the local 
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people. This is how this study defines expeditionary forces. 
The CAR provides a tool that gives strength to Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) sized MAGTF's when faced with highly sophisticated enemies. The CAR 
also creates a pool of mechanized infantry trained Marines, able to work more 
effective in the mid to high intensity conflict area. Yet, the CAR fails to fit the 
presently available shipping assets. This strips the CAR of much of its speed in 
strategic deployments and places it in the Follow Echelon role for Marine 
planners. Even if Maritime Preposition Force (MPF) shipping is expanded to lift 
the CAR, by accepted planning estimates it is a ten day wait before the CAR's 
equipment would be off loaded in a battle area. This shortfall alone maybe a 
critical blow to fielding a CAR even with the added capability it provides the 
force. If this shortfall can be overcome then the CAR would be very useful in 
future high intensity conflicts. 
What is important to understand about this discussion is that the CAR 
concept may not fit the role the Marine Corps envisions for itself or is expected 
to perform. The CAR concept is an exceptional ideal to provide a heavier more 
tactically mobile combat force within the Marine Division. On the other hand, 
the CAR is realistically to cumbersome to rapidly deploy to a crisis spot on short 
notice. As good as the CAR concept is, it may be a tool to fight the last war.and 
not the conflicts of the nations future. This provides the back drop for the next 
chapter which moves the discussion of the CAR's usefulness into the cost of its 
elements. 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF COST 
A. INTRODUCTION TO COSTING 
The reason for developing cost estimates is the realization that resources 
are limited or as the Department of Defense has found, shrinking. Stewart 
describes cost estimating as a way to allocate resources and the objective of 
cost estimating as being a way to describe the cost of using a combination of 
resources to achieve a desired level of service (Stewart, 1991, p.2). He 
categorizes cost estimating into either a parametric "top-down" approach or a 
industrial engineering "bottoms-up" approach. The parametric method uses 
historical data and is normally done early in the life or development of a 
program. The industrial engineering approach is used later. in the program's life 
and requires detailed estimates of all the sub elements of the program. It is 
therefore expensive, time consuming, and difficult to do. The parametric 
method is normally relatively quick to do but is limited because it often falls to 
directly associate costs to specific elements of the program. 
In developing a cost estimate, there are several accepted methods: detailed 
estimating, direct estimating, estimating by analogy, quotes, learning curve 
theory, statistical methods, and handbook estimating. Each has advantages or 
disadvantages based on the information available and the estimators skill. In 
estimating the CAR's cost, direct estimating, quotes, and learning curve theory 
were ruled out because of the lack of detailed information and the poor 
definition of the units organization. The use of detailed estimating methods 
required the specific components of the CAR be known which to accurately 
measure is a massive and time consuming project. For this reason detailed 
21 
estimating was ruled out. This leaves statistical methods and handbook 
estimating. Presently the U.S. Army operates many mechanized infantry 
organizations which perhaps could be used to develop a statistical estimate for 
the CAR. The author choose not to use this method because of the differences 
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between the way the Army develops its costs and operates its units. Handbook 
estimating was selected because the Marine Corps has developed internal cost 
factors that apply more specifically to the organic units of the Marines. The best 
currently available estimating source is the Marine Corps Cost Factor Manual 
which is the standard handbook of all the accepted cost factors used by the 
Marine Corps. Extracting the CARis cost from the manual by using similar units 
or standard costs allows a description to be made of the CAR's expected cost. 
This is a combination of the handbook and analogy estimating methods. These 
methods are acceptable during the early stages of a project when the specifics 
of the project are only generally defined, which is the CAR's situation. There 
are some pitfalls in this method, because the values taken from the handbook 
may not completely or accurately reflect the actual item being estimated. Also 
the handbook estimates generally do not produce estimates with as much detail 
as can be achieved through other methods. Therefore, this method produces 
only a starting point or baseline cost. The advantage of handbook estimating is 
that it is quick and can be applied to a wide variety of situations. This estimate 
will help determine the economic feasibility of the CAR. Future evaluators 
should understand that much of the estimate is based on the author's 
experience and personal judgment as to the similarity between current units 
and the future CAR's units. 
1. Fielding Cost Calculations 
The first aspect of the CAR that will be estimated is the initial start up cost, 
or fielding cost. Under this area, the cost to put the vehicle, either LAV or AAV 
into the CAR will be developed from the cost manual or program coordinator 
estimates. Also, under this cost will be the CAR's equipment. Equipment will be 
broken down into individual equipment cost and organizational equipment cost. 
The individual equipment cost include the individual's weapon and personal 
"782 gear". Organizational equipment includes everything else that must be 
bought with appropriated Marine Corps dollars, except the armored vehicle. 
This distinction is made because the vehicle cost is being estimated separately 
as well as compared between the two proposed CAR's. A cost factor for 
organizational equipment will be developed from the Cost manual. The current 
standing unit's organizational equipment value is broken out in the manual. 
From that value the standard unit price for each vehicle can be summed and 
subtracted out. This leaves only the value of the organization equipment 
required to support the number of vehicles in the unit. This organization 
equipment cost minus vehicles can then be divided by the number of tanks, 
LA V's or AAV's in the battalion to develop an organization equipment cost 
factor. This factor is then multiplied against the expected number of vehicles in 
the CAR to estimate it's organization equipment cost. 
2. Life Cycle Cost Calculations 
To develop the CAR's cost, this thesis will focus on the organizations Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC) over a twenty year period. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
LCC estimate will include personnel cost, maintenance cost, and ammunition 
cost. Personnel cost is the average cost from the standard cost manual for the 
enlisted and officer personnel converted to fiscal year 1993 values. 
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Maintenance cost will be developed from an organization maintenance factor 
(First and Second echelon maintenance) developed in each of the standing 
units that would provide skills or equipment to the CAR. Third and Fourth 
echelon maintenance costs as well as SECREPs will be developed as 
separate costs. Depot level maintenance costs will not be considered here but 
often are part of LCC estimates. Ammunition cost is developed from the Cost 
Factors manual and with each standing unit forecast of ammunition. Each 
standing units uses hundreds of various ammunition types annually. To narrow 
the scope of the ammunition calculation only the most expensive and highest 
use type are included in the estimate. This allows a general estimate to be 
developed without estimating every type of ammunitions used by the unit. 
Some types of munitions were left out because the use rates are based per 
weapon. If the number of weapons in the organization could not be accurately 
estimated then the ammunition was not estimated. This was the case with the 
Shoulder Launched Multipurpose Weapon (SMAW). 
3. Definition of Work 
Now that the items or areas to be costed have been identified, the next 
step is to define the work. To develop the CAR's estimate, or any cost estimate, 
the scope of work or work breakdown must be clearly defined. Since no 
. organization like the CAR exist in the Marine Corps, the first step is to develop 
the stand-up cost or fielding cost of the various CAR components. To facilitate 
the development of the estimate, each unit will be estimated at one level below 
the level that they would be employed tactically. For example the LAR 
Company cost will be presented as a cost for the total company but the details 
were developed from the cost of individual platoons. In some cases when 
estimating the cost of the CAR alternatives the estimates were based on 
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individual vehicle cost, for example, crewmen. Once the cost of each CAR's 
components is developed and summed at the battalion level, the total estimated 
peacetime operating cost for twenty years can be calculated. 
This estimate will not reflect the cost associated with the CAR or Marine 
Corps operating tempo. The individual cost of training exercises could not be 
factored in because of the variability between Marine Corps units based on 
location. Although maintenance costs in some respects are dependent on the 
amount of time a unit spends in the field, average maintenance costs will be 
used. Another aspect of this estimate is that some costs are either the same 
between the old division structure and the new or at least the same between the 
proposed CAR structures. The infantry organization is the primary cost that 
does not change between the division with or without a CAR. Additionally, the 
cost for the tank battalion, and Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Company 
are the same between various CAR structures. The estimate will represent the 
additional cost to the Marine Corps to operate one CAR's worth of additional 
armored vehicles plus the cost of the current, in place, force structure. 
4. Constant Cost Elements 
This section will discuss those costs that are special cases or are similar 
in both CARs and old or new division structures. Here the term constant cost 
refers to those cost that are generated by units or components of the CAR or 
division regardless of the final choice of APC. It will specifically discuss the tank 
. battalion, Ught Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Company and the cost of the 
infantry assigned to the CAR. In some analysis these would not be considered 
at all since they represent a "sunk cosf'. A sunk cost is one that has "already 
been incurred and that cannot be changed by any decision made now or in the 
future. "(Garrison,1991,p.44). The cost of the tank battalion, Regimental H&S 
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Company, and the infantry has already been incurred and little can be done 
about them. Often sunk cost are not included in a systems cost because only 
the increment or additional cost is relevant. In this case since an fielding cost 
for the total CAR is being estimated, it is relevant to the analysis. 
The cost of the LAR company is a cost that is new to the cost of operating 
the division and a sunk cost when comparing CAR alternatives. Although LAR 
companies already exist, the CAR's LAR will be an additional company. 
B. TANK BAn ALI ON COMPONENT COST 
The battalion is organized into four tank companies and one Headquarters 
and Service (H&S) company with fifty-eight M1 A 1 tanks. Each tank company 
has fourteen tanks with five officers and ninety enlisted Marines. The H&S 
company has twenty-nine USMC officers, 393 USMC enlisted, two Naval 
officers and thirty-five Navy enlisted. The H&S company also has two M1 A 1 
tanks and all the logistic and administrative support overhead for the battalion. 
Some structure will be added such as a LAV mortar platoon and LAV-25 scout 
platoon. Their personnel numbers are included in the H&S company's 
personnel strength and the vehicles would consist of four LA V-25's and two 
LAV(M) with 81mm mortars. One LAV(C) would also be added to the battalion. 
1. Tank Battalion's Equipment Cost 
The first cost to be examined in the tank battalion is eqUipment cost. 
Here equipment cost are calculated to demonstrate the method used as they do 
not impact on the battalions annual operating cost. Equipment falls into two 
categories; organization and individual. Organization equipment consists of 
major end items like tanks and trucks while individual eqUipment consists of the 
items issued directly to the Marine (rifle, pack, and helmet) normally referred to 
as 782 gear. Individual equipment is handled first because it depends primarily 
on the organization's personnel strength .. 
a. Tank Battalion's Individual Equipment Cost 
The average cost per individual for 782 gear in is $779 FY90. Inflated 
with the procurement inflation factor of 0.8934 (by dividing) to an FY93 value of 
$872 per Marine or Sailor. The cost of the Marine's weapon depends on 
whether he is armed with the M16A2 rifle or the M9 9mm pistol. In this analysis, 
it is assumed that only USMC officers and the Navy personnel will carry the M9 
pistol. This will result in a higher individual weapon cost overall because many 
enlisted Marines will actually be armed with the pistol, depending on rank and 
billet. The FY93 cost for an M16A2 is $713 and $273 for an M9 pistol. These 
costs can now be combined with the 782 gear cost to create an individual 
equipment cost for the tank battalion: 
839 personnel in battalion 
x872 dollars to outfit one Marine with 782 gear 
$731,608 Total Cost Of 782 Gear For Tank Battalion 
86 personnel armed with M9 x $273 per weapon = 23,478 
753 personnel armed with M16A2 x $713 per weapon = 536,889 
Total Cost of Individual Weapons = $560,367 
Thus, the total cost for a tank battalion's individual equipment is $1,291,975. 
b. Tank Battalion's Organizational Equipment Cost 
The issue of organizational equipment is much more difficult to 
address because unit's often have slightly different tables of equipment. For 
this analysis the primary weapon system in a tank battalion is the M1 A 1. It will 
be considered as the main cost driver, with all other organization eqUipment 
added to it as a factor similar to overhead. This is a reasonable assumption 
because every piece of equipment in the unit is designed to in some way to 
help the tanks perform their mission. The cost manual describes the cost for the 
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old M60A 1 tank battalion which fielded seventy M60 tanks. The M60 tanks 
standard unit price is subtracted from the battalion's organizational equipment 
value of $100,360,000 FY90 for a remaining organizational equipment pool 
value of $37,867,850 which then must be inflated to a FY93 value of 
$42,386,221. Now the organizational equipment factor is developed by 
dividing this value by the original seventy tanks for a factor of $605,517 per 
tank. Next the factor is multiplied by the fifty-eight M1A1 tanks in the CAR tank 
battalion to create a total estimate of $35,119,986 worth of organizational 
equipment. Additionally the cost of the tank battalions new organic LA Vs must 
be added-to the tank battalions total. The LAVs will cost approximately 
$5,491,799, bringing the tank battalion's total organizational equipment cost to 
$40,611,785 FY93. The LAV cost comes from the standard vehicle costs which 
are examined in the section about the LAR company. The disadvantage of this 
method is that it fails to identify the fixed and variable cost within the tank 
battalion. This is important because some of the organizational equipment is 
the same regardless of the number of tanks in the battalion. 
Additionally, the fielding cost for a tank battalion is approximately 
$41,903,760 without the cost of the M1A1 tank (which cost approximately $3.4 
million each) and facilities. This type of analysis will be used to calculate all the 
following units. The next section will begin the development Of. the Life Cycle 
Cost (LCC). 
2. Tank Battalion's Personnel Cost 
The first LCC element to be examined is the cost of personnel. The total 




















The cost factor manual provides the Annual Average personnel cost in FY90 
dollars which must be inflated to reflect the FY93 base used in this analysis. 
The cost factors manual also provides inflation tables for various cost categories 
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The next cost to be discussed for the tank battalion is maintenance cost. 
The cost of required organizational maintenance is dependent on the amount of 
operation time. Additionally, the tank battalions in each division have different 
operational environments which result in different total operating hours. For this 
analysis an average of 250 hours of operation per year will be used. This is 
based on interviews with tank battalion operations officers. The average 
maintenance cost is $200 per hour of operation, (also from tank battalion 
operations officers) and includes the cost of fuel, lubricant, and organizational 
repair parts. Therefore, for the fifty-eight M1 A 1's in a battalion the annual 
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average maintenance cost is $2,900,000. 
One individual equipment cost that does impact on the battalions annual 
expense is the cost of equipment upkeep or maintenance. This must be 
calculated separately from the battalions organizational maintenance cost. To 
develop this value. the cost manual presents a standard value of $448 FY90 for 
yearly upkeep. This figure is inflated by dividing it by the inflation factor for 
operations and maintenance which is 0.8625 and results in a FY93 value of 
$519. This is then multiplied by the battalions total end strength for a resulting 
estimate of $435,441 to annually maintain the battalions 782 gear. 
Another aspect of maintenance is third and fourth echelon maintenance 
cost. The $200 factor only applies to the organization level of first and second 
echelon of maintenance. Tank battalion also has organic third echelon 
capability although it is not charged directly for that cost generated by function. 
The 1st FSSG comptroller's office must keep track of the cost of third, fourth and 
SECREPs cost because of the Combined Arms Exercises (SA) conducted at the 
Twenty-Nine Palms combat center. For these exerCises, east coast units use 
west coast units equipment and a charge back must be used to charge the east 
coast units for the maintenance cost. The 1 st FSSG comptroller uses these cost 
factors to help calculate this cost area. This author does not include the 
generated cost in the LCe calculation here but does total them in the LCC 
Summary appendix. The reason for this that the factors are based on calender 
use vise hours of use and that the CAR units would not be directly charged for 
the costs generated by these maintenance functions. 
For a Tank battalion, the factor is $193 per month per vehicle for third and 
fourth echelon work. For SECREPs the factor is $4,391 per month per vehicle. 
Using these factors over twelve months for the fifty-eight tanks in the battalion 
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produces costs for third and fourth echelon of $134,328 and for SECREPs of 
$3,056,136. Over a twenty year period, this produces costs of $2.7 million in 
third and fourth echelon maintenance and $61.1 million for SECREPs. An 
important note here is that the M1A1 tank is still under warranty, and the third 
and fourth echelon cost estimates may be lower than actual value. 
4. Tank Battalion's Ammunition Usage Cost 
Ammunition is a major expenditure in any military organization and is 
therefore included in the annual operating cost of the unit. A tank battalion 
manages over seventy types of ordinance so only the high use, high cost types 
will be used to forecast the tank battalions ammunition cost. The following list 
describes the types, quantities, and total cost used in this analysis. 
~ Quantity Total Cost 
M16A2 5.56 mm Ball 67,017 14,744 
Blank 150,600 18,072 
7.62mm Blank 104,000 28,080 
4 in 1 681,600 436,224 
.50 cal 4 in 1 87,000 127,020 
120mm TP-T 3,306 3,085,688 
TPCSDS-T 7,134 5,412,280 
HEAT-MP-T 464 1,408,364 
81 mm Ilium 110 17,614 
HE 800 72,000 
Smoke-up 110 13,538 
25mm APDS-T 1,200 20,124 
HEI-T 1,200 25,128 
TP-T 1,888 21 ,920 
Total Ammunition Estimate $10,701,066 
This allows the development of a total one year operation cost as follows: 
Total Personnel Cost 
Vehicle Maintenance Cost 
Individual Equipment Upkeep Cost 





Annual Estimated Operation Cost (FY93) $39,384,552 
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This value of $39.3 million can be multiplied by twenty years to develop a 
twenty year LCC of $786 million. 
C. LIGHT ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE (LAR) COMPANY COMPONENT 
COST 
The LAR consists of fourteen LA V-25, three LA V(L) , three LA V(C), one 
LAV(R) , two LAV(M) , and four LAV(AT). The company has five officers and 112 
enlisted Marines organized into a Headquarters section with three LAR 
platoons. This organization is basically the same as currently exists in the Ught 
Armored Reconnaissance Battalion which prior to the Persian Gulf War was 
deSignated Ught Armored Infantry Battalion (LAI). The analysis conducted will 
include the same steps as performed on the tank battalion so only the results 
will be discussed here and any different assumptions that must be made. 
1. LAR Company's Vehicle Procurement 
The first major difference is that all of the LAR's vehicles must be 
procured, as they currently don't exist in sufficient quantities to support the 
organization. The following table lists the Replacement cost for each vehicle 















Total Procurement Cost 
















The same calculations are made for individual equipment with one 
exception. The total exact quantity of M16A2 rifle's and M9 pistol's is known to 
be 104 and 13 respectively. 
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117 company personnel x $872 to outfit one Marine with 782 gear = $102,024 
13 personnel armed with pistols x $273 per M9 = 3,549 
104 personnel armed with M16A2 x $713 per M16A2 = 77.701 
TOTAL COST OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS 77,701 
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT COST $179,725 
The cost of organization equipment is taken from the Cost Factors 
Manual with the cost of the LA V's removed. This was easily done because of 
the Similarities between the future LAR company and the current LAI 
reconnaissance company. The value of the organizational equipment is 
$945.293 FY93. 
The result of these calculations produce a fielding cost for the LAR company of: 
Vehicle Procurement 
Individual Equipment Cost 
Organizational Equipment Cost 
Estimated Fielding Cost 





Again the first LCC element to cost out is the personnel cost which are 
based on the same values from the cost manual as was used for tank battalions. 
One note is that the LAR company has no organic Naval personnel so any 
needed medical corpsman would be assigned on an as needed basis from the 










Total Personnel Cost 
4. LAR Company's Maintenance Cost 
The next major assumption which changes is the average maintenance 
cost to operate the LAV. The LAV planning figure for hourly operation is $100. 
Additionally, because the LA V is wheeled, making it more like a truck or car, it 
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normally operates at rates well over 250 hours annually (Close to 400 hours). 
Yet, for this study 250 hours will be set as the target calculation rate for all 
vehicles to provide consistency throughout the report. This will ensure that 
when the CAR options are compared that the comparison is over the same 
conditions. 
The planning factor for LA V operations is $100 per hour, per vehicle with 
250 hours annually operations. The total number of LA V family vehicle in the 
LAR company is twenty-seven which results in an annual average 
organizational maintenance cost of $675,000. The maintenance cost of the 
companies Individual equipment is $60,723 based on and end strength of 117 
Marines. 
Here again third and fourth echelon and SECREP costs will be 
calculated using 1 st FSSG factors. Using twelve months and twenty-seven 
vehicles the third and fourth echelon factor is $516 and produces $167,184 
which over twenty years is $3.3 million. The SECREP factor is $464 and 
produces an annual cost of $150,336 and a twenty year cost of three million 
dollars. Here it is important to note that these factors are for the LA V-25 which is 
the most expensive LA V to operate. 
5. LAR Company's Ammunition Usage Cost 
The last of the LCC elements to estimate is the ammunition which is 
based on the following values: 
Type Quantity Total Cost 
M16A2 5,56 mm Ball 9256 2,036 
Blank 20,800 2,496 
7.62mm Blank 108,000 29,160 
4 in 1 129,600 82,944 
25mm APDS-T 4200 70,434 
HEI-T 4200 87,948 
TP-T 6608 76,719 
81 mm ilium 110 13.538 
Total Ammunition Estimate $454,889 
All twenty-seven vehicles in the company are armed with a 7.62 mm 
machine gun for self defense and do not mount the .50 caliber machine gun. 
Each vehicle's gun requirement is used to develop the estimate. TOW missiles 
are not used in the estimate because of their low annual use rate (most TOW 
gunners are trained with simulators). 
This resulting annual operation cost is: 
Total Personnel Cost 
Vehicle Maintenance Cost 
Individual Equipment Upkeep Cost 
Annual Ammunition Cost 






Over the twenty year life cycle of the vehicles the LAR company can be 
expected to cost $92 million. 
D. ORGANIC INFANTRY AND REGIMENTAL H&S COMPANY COMPONENT 
COST 
This section will discuss the cost of the infantry structure already in place that 
the future armored vehicles will be superimposed on. Normal infantry 
regiments have three infantry battalions and a Regimental H&S Company. The 
current infantry battalions have three rifle companies, one weapons company, 
and one H&S company. The total number of personnel under this organization 
is 156 USMC officers, 2,879 USMC enlisted, eleven USN officers, and 205 
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USN enlisted. Under the CAR one full infantry battalion's forty-four officers, 861 
enlisted Marines, and sixty-nine USN personnel disappear. Also the normal 
twelve Marine infantry squad shrinks to nine Marines, a 25% reduction per 
squad. Specifically, the current rifle company, which consists of six officers and 
176 enlisted, changes to a Ught Armored Infantry Company with three officers 
and 117 enlisted including the vehicle crewmen. On the other hand, the H&S 
company currently has twenty-one USMC officers, 180 enlisted and 69 USN 
personnel while the Light Armored Infantry battalions, H&S company increases 
to twenty-two officers, 340 enlisted and thirty-three USN personnel. Much of 
this increase comes from adding LA V maintenance personnel and from the 
H&S company assuming some of the combat support roles of the weapons 
company like antitank sections and scout platoons. A Similar change occurs 
with the Regimental H&S company. To help understand the differences the 
following table is provided: 
CURRENT TABLE ORGANIZATION CAR TABLE ORGANIZATION 
USMC USN USMC USN 
(0) (E) (0) (E) (0) (E) (0) (E) 
Regimental Totals 156 2879 11 205 102 1954 6 87 
Regimental H&S 24 296 2 7 28 320 2 25 
Battalion Totals(X3) 132 2583 9 198 (x2) 74 1634 4 62 
Single Bn 44 861 3 66 37 817 2 31 
H&SCompany 21 180 3 66 22 340 2 31 
Weapons Company 5 153 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Rifle Company(x3) 18 528 0 0 15 477 0 0 
Single Rifle Company 6 176 0 0 5 159 0 0 
LAI units were organized prior to the Persian Gulf War, with no weapons 
platoon and this caused some functional problems. Most of the weapon 
company's assets were task organized into the LAI companies during the war to 
solve these problems. Currently, there isa push within the CAR planning 
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groups to build within the CAR's LAI company a separate weapons company to 
facilitate this. The results would. be that the same total number of vehicles (106 
per battalion) and personnel will be organized differently than current 
expectations. In this thesis the LAI weapons company will not be developed as 
a separate unit because it has not been decided if it will be. fielded as a 
separate company. In the LAI table of organization the third infantry battalion 
has been subtracted from the total end strength plus the nine man squad is 
adopted. These numbers produce a 32% reduction in available infantry 
(excluding USN personnel), and as displayed, include the additional 501 non-
infantry personnel that are vehicle crews and mechanics. When these 
additional 501 enlisted Marines are subtracted they provide the real number of 
infantry available, assuming that every Marine is an infantryman, and the values 
that will be used to calculate the cost of the infantry structure. 
1. Discussion of Fielding Cost of the Infantry Structure 
The infantry organization is already in existence and will be reduced in· 
size from the current organization. Therefore, there is no fielding cost incurred 
from the infantry portion of the CAR. The fact is that the infantry organization will 
take a 32% reduction from the lost troops taken by the force reduction. Due to 
this reduction the organization's equipment value would drop from $37.9 million 
to approximately $25.8 million. This cost saving would not be fully realized as 
much of the $12.1 million worth of equipment would probably go into storage at 
the Marine Corps Logistics Bases or be redistributed to other units. The savings 
would come in the form of reduced costs to maintain and operate the 
equipment. To establish a reference measurement, the cost of individual 
equipment is developed here. The same methods used for tank battalion also 
apply to the cost of individual eqUipment and weapons. 
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Total Personnel 1648 x $872 cost to outfit with 782 gear = $1,437,056 
195 personnel armed with M9 x $273 per pistol 
1453 personnel armed with M16A2 x $713 per rifle 




TOTAL COST OF INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT $2,526,280 . 
2. Infantry Structure Personnel Cost 
Staying in the established LCC format, the personnel costs are 
developed first. The without vehicle operator numbers, described in the 
introduction of this section, will be used to develop the cost for the infantry 
components of the CAR. Using the same methods as in the tank battalion and 
LAR examples the personnel costs of the infantry regiment are as follows: 
PERSONNEL 
USMC Officer 102 
Enlisted 1453 
USN Officer 6 
Enlisted 87 
Total Personnel Cost 












Annual Maintenance cost will be calculated on the cost factor manuals 
value of $519 FY93 per individual. Once again the assumption is made that the 
individual infantryman is the main cost driver. 
Total Personnel 1648 x $519 = $855,312 Individual Equipment Upkeep Cost 
4. Infantry Structure Ammunition Usage Cost 
The ammunition estimate for the infantry elements is the most difficult to 
develop. The reason for the difficulty is that no clear plan exist at this time as to 
what weapons will remain within the smaller regiment. In this estimate current 
mixtures were assumed to be maintained. One example of this is the M203 
grenade launcher, which currently is fielded with a mixture of one per four man 
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fireteam. Under this mixture the CAR squad has two M203s with three squads 
per platoon, three platoons per company, three companies per battalion, and 
two battalions per CAR for a total of 108 M203s. The other main difference with 
the infantry's ammunition estimate is that M16A2 5.56 ball and blank 
ammunition has a higher use rate for infantry personnel than for vehicle crews. 
The infantry uses 5.56mm ball at a rate of 190 rounds per weapon rather than 
the eighty-nine rounds per weapon for vehicles crews. With 5.56mm blank the 
infantry planning factor is 400 rounds per weapon vise 200 for crewmen. The 
following table provides the ammunition summary for the infantry elements of 
the CAR: 
~ 
M16A2 5.56mm Ball 
Blank 
7.62 mm Blank 
.4 in 1 
M203 40 mm WSP 
MK19 40 mm HE-DP 
60 mm ilium 
Smoke-WP 
HE 































This goes into the LCC calculation which are presented in tabular from: 
Total Personnel Cost 
Individual Equipment Upkeep Cost 
Annual Ammunition Cost 





The expected twenty year LCC is estimated to be $1,056 million. 
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E. SUMMARY OF CONSTANT COST ELEMENTS 
Three elements of any CAR are sunk or constant cost whose value does not 
change regardless of the armor vehicle selected to move the infantry. The 
combined cost to operate the CAR's tank battalion, LAR company, and the 
infantry structure for twenty years is $1,934 million FY 93. This of course does 
not include the cost of purchasing the additional LAV's and equipment required 
for the LAR company. Each of the individual element estimates show that 
personnel costs contribute the most to the overall operating costs of the 
presently standing elements of the CAR. The only cost reduction comes from 
the down sizing of the infantry force which produces an annual cost savings of 
more than $30 million (Personnei Cost oi one iniantry Battaiion) in personnei. 
This could pay for the cost of fielding the LAR company's LAV's and equipment. 
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IV. CAR VEHICLE OPTIONS 
In this Chapter the various CAR vehicle options costs will be developed. 
The same methods used in Chapter III are applied here, but the focus is on the 
cost generated by either LA Vs or AAVs. The AAAV is only discussed in general 
terms and no detailed cost estimate is provided. The first cost to be developed 
will be that of a CAA(LAV)'s vehicles and operators. 
A. LA V BASED CAR COSTS 
When the CAR was originally conceived, it was during the post Desert storm 
euphoria. At that time the LA V was seen as the armored vehicle of the Marine 
Corps future. The two Light Armored Infantry battalions had performed 
extremely well with their LA V-25's in Southwest Asia. These battalions, 
although not truly infantry battalions, had acted in a fashion much like calvary 
units. So when the idea for the CAR first was formulated, the LA V was the only 
choice considered for the APC. This was seen as the next step in the 
development of the LA V family of vehicles. For this reason, the cost analysis of 
the CAR(LA V) will be developed first. There is presently a table of organization 
and an acquisition initiative (in POM 94) available to support much of the 
calculations. First the initial cost or fielding cost will be established. 
1. CAR (LA V) Vehicle Acquisition 
The acquisition of the CAR's required vehicles must be considered to 
determine the stand-up cost, since the CAR (LA V) is an all new organization. 
Each CAR(LA V) will have approximately the following quantity and mix of 
vehicles in it's two LAI battalions and H&S company. 
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Total Qty per Bn Reg. H&S Qty 
LAV25 42 21 ° 
Personnel(P) 78 39 0 
Logistics(L) 34 16 2 
Command(C) 12 4 4 
Recovery(R) 13 6 1 
Mortar(M) 16 8 0 
Antitank(A T) aQ 12 12 
TOTAL VEHICLES 231 106 19 
TOTAL VEHICLE ACQUISITION COST (FY93) 
















The POM 94 acquisition proposal calls for the purchase of 400 plus 
LA V's in all variants. This would provide over 200 of the personnel variants and 
enough total vehicles for two CAR's but not for the MPF. The total estimated 
cost is estimated to be approximately $620 million with deliveries occurring from 
FY 96 to FY 2000. A proposal exists for the current LAV(P) or Bison to receive 
a .50 caliber machine gun or MK19 automatic grenade launcher station to 
increase the vehicles firepower but no estimates are available as to how much 
this would cost or what effect it would have on troop capacity. 
2. CAR(LA V) Equipment Cost 
Individual equipment and weapons costs are calculated in the same 
manner as has previously been described and result in an individual equipment 
value of $436,872 and an individual weapons value of $357,213 assuming all 
501 Marines will be armed with M16A2's. The total individual equipment cost is 
$794,085. 
Organization equipment costs will be allocated based on the total 
number of LAVs. To develop this dollar amount the organization equipment 
cost of the original LAI battalion will be extracted from the Cost Factors manual 
and distributed to the LA Vs in it's organization. Here the same method is used 
as was used with tank battalion. This will provide a cost per vehicle that can be 
transferred to the vehicles in the CAR. The original LAI had 114 vehicles in all 
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variants except the personnel model. These calculations provide an 
organization equipment cost of $187,473 per LAV, which in turn provides a total 
organization equipment value of $43,306,283 for the CAR(LAV). 
3. CAR(LA V) Fielding Cost SummarY 
The cost to field the CAR(LA V) is a combination of the cost of the new 
LA Vs and equipment cost. This results in a total initial cost of approximately 
$223.3 million. This cost is slightly inflated because almost all of the individual 
equipment saved by the infantry force reduction which was probably going in to 
storage can be transferred to the 501 personnel required for support of the 
CAR's LA Vs. Although less than one million dollars, this allows for the use of 
existing equipment stocks. It should be understood that this savings applies to 
any CAR variant. Next, the LCC elements of the CAR(LAV) will be calculated. 
4. CAR (LA V) Personnel Cost 
In this section only the additional cost of the vehicle crews and 
mechanics will be examined as all other personnel have been accounted for 
under the Infantry organization structure. Crews are defined as personnel 
involved directly in the operation of the vehicle and in the LA V 25's case, 
maning the vehicle's weapons. The LAV(AT) TOW gunners, and LAV(M) 81mm 
mortar men are not considered here because they man basically the same 
system regardless of what vehicle it is mounted in and so have been grouped 
into the infantry structures cost. 


























Additionally, there will be approximately 79 LA V specific mechanics. The total 
for LA V specific crews and mechanics is 501 Marine enlisted whose cost is 
$13,916,n FY93. 
5. CAR (LA V) Maintenance Cost 
This section will use the same planning factors as those for the LAR 
company with 250 hours of annual operations and $100 per hour per vehicle. 
This provides a maintenance cost of $5,775,000. This value is slightly inflated 
because the planning factor is developed from LA V 25 based units which are 
more costly to operate due to the 25 mm gun than the proposed personnel 
variant which makes up most of the CAR's vehicles. Also, the cost to upkeep 
the 501 operators individual equipment must be· developed. This value is 
$260,019 when the $519 maintenance factor is applied. 
To develop an estimate of the third, fourth and SECREP costs, 1 st FSSG 
factors are used again. For the CAR (LAV)s 231 vehicles over twelve months, 
the $516 third and fourth echelon cost is used to generate $1,430,352 which 
over twenty years is $28.6 million. In the SECREP category, a $464 monthly 
factor is used to produce an annual cost of $1,286,208 and a twenty year cost of 
$25.7 million. 
6. CAR (LA V) Ammunition Usage Cost 
The calculations for ammunition are, done the same as has been 
previously described. The exception is that two alternative costs are presented. 
The first assumes that all LA Vs will be used in the existing armament 
configuration with only the 7.62 mm machine gun for protection. The second 
alternative examines the cost of ammunition if the LAV(P) receives a.50 caliber 
weapon station. The first table shows the ammunition that is constant for both 
alternatives. 
Type Quantity Cost 
M16A2 5,56mm Ball 44,589 9,810 
Blank 100,200 12,024 
25mm APDS-T 12,600 211,302 
HEI-T 12,600 263,844 
TP-T 19,740 229,181 
7,62mm Blank 468,000 126,360 
4in 1 561,600 ~59.424 
Total $1,211,945 
The 7.62 ammunition is used by the LAV 25, LAV(L) , LAV(C), LAV(M), and 
LA VCR) whose armorment will not change. The next table calculates the cost if 
all LAV(P)'s have 7.62 mm machine guns: 
Type 
7.62 mm Blank 




LAV(P) Specific Cost 








The same process is used for the .50 caliber variant of the LA Yep) 
.50 cal 
~ 
4 in 1 
Quantity 
117,000 






The .50 caliber upgrade of the LAV(P) would prove to be a less expensive 
system to operate because it has no blank ammunition. 
7. CAR (LA V) Life Cycle Cost Summary 
The following table represents the one year operation cost for a CAR 
(LA V) with the APC armed with .50 caliber machine guns: 
Total Personnel Cost 
Vehicle Maintenance Cost 
Individual Equipment Upkeep Cost 
Annual Ammunition Cost 







Now using twenty years produces a total LCC of $426 million. This added to 
the LCC values for each of the standing elements of the CAR creates a total 
LCC of $2,360 million. Only $518 million of this is the cost generated by the 
new vehicles and structure. Therefore for about a 22% increase in cost, the 
Marine Corps achieves a 32% force reduction (this reduction is the lost infantry 
structure) with ari expected increase in combat power. 
Yet, the fielding cost is significant at over $200 million. On the other 
hand, when the current three-battalion infantry regiment LCC for twenty years is 
developed the same way as was done in this analysis it has a total cost of 
$2,042 million. This demonstrates that the CAR(LAV) is only 13% more 
expensive than the current non-mechanized infantry operational units. A 
comparison of the CAR (LA V) to the original LAI battalion (with its 149 LA V's) 
whose similar cost is $582 million shows the CAR(LA V) to be almost four times 
as expensive. 
B. AAV BASED CAR COSTS 
The CAR(AAV) was not originally considered in the CAR conception. It was 
not until "From the Sea" was published that Marine planners began to seriously 
consider building the CAR around the AAV. The AAV was previously dismissed 
because of it's age, excepted higher operating cost, and slower overland 
speed, which reduced it's ability to function with the M1 A 1 tank. "From the Sea" 
emphasized expeditionary forces and crisis response, making it practical to 
consider using AAV's or even AAAV's to support the new concepts. The AA V 
amphibious capability gives it great flexibility in these types of environments. 
Another strength of the AA V is its larger troop capacity which would require half 
the vehicles when compared to an CAR(LA V). In the CAR(AA V), only two 
company sized AAV units would be required to tactically lift the CAR's infantry 
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assets. This boils down to forty-seven AAVs per infantry battalion or ninety-four 
AA Vs per CAR regiment. The present Marine Corps fleet of over 1200 AAVs 
has sufficient numbers of AAVs available so that a new production line would 
not have to be opened. 
1. CAR(AAV) Vehicle Fielding Cost 
Although new vehicles would not have to be purchased, the fielding of 
the AAVs would incur some cost. The ninety-four AAVs per regiment or 188 
AAVs for two regiments are not currently in a fully operational condition. The 
total of 188 vehicles are in various states of repair at the two Marine Corps 
Logistics Bases located at Albany, Georgia and Barstow, California. These 
vehicles are not part of the War Reserve but act as the maintenance buffer stock . 
that allow AAVs in the FMF to be cycled through depot level maintenance 
without degrading the active forces. Here the term buffer stock means that 
these AAVs are either on the maintenance line or in holding lots and provide for 
a constant exchange of upgraded or repaired vehicles with those coming from 
FMF units. This also means that some of the total 188 vehicles could be 
somewhere in transit which actually distorts the number slightly. The decision 
to use these vehicles in fielding the two CARs would have to be tempered with 
the realization that almost a full battalions worth of AA Vs could be unavailable 
due to maintenance rotation (if the program continues to receive annual funding 
and is continued). 
With that understanding, this thesis will assume for cost purposes that 
this decision has been made and all the vehicles will be upgraded to combat 
status. The AAVs at both Logistics Bases are repaired through a program 
called IROAN (Inspect, Repair Only as Necessary) and the average per vehicle 
cost has been determined for FY93 to be $79,784 at Albany and $96,401 at 
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Barstow. These costs fluctuate with the nation's economy and are only fixed 
annually. Additionally, there are approximately eighty-six AAV's at Albany and 
eighty-four at Barstow awaiting repairs or delivery while the remaining balance 
of vehicle is in transit. For those additional 18 vehicles it will be assumed that 














This would be the cost to field two complete CAR(AAV)s but since this 
analYSis is dealing with only the cost of one CAR's operations, different mixtures 
for AAV repair location could be conceived. This thesis will only consider the 
.most expensive fielding cost of all ninety-four AAV's being repaired at Barstow 
for a total cost of $9,061,694. This is compared to the acquisition cost of $179.2 
million for one CAR(LA V)'s vehicles. 
2. CAR(AA V) Equipment Cost 
Each Marine will be assigned an M16A2 which generates a personnel 
weapons cost of $250,263. The next step is to calculate the 782 gear cost for 
individual equipment. This value is $306,072 which combines with the 
individual weapons cost to give a total individual equipment cost of $556,335 
for the CAR(AAV) required crews anQ mechanics. 
Organization equipment cost will be allocated just of was done for the 
LA V's except in the CAR(AA V) the AAV is considered the main cost driver. 
Again the cost will be extracted from the cost factors manual with the allocation 
factor being created based on the current 184 AAV's in an Amphibious Assault 
Battalion. This creates an organization equipment overhead factor of $328,118 
per vehicle, which when multiplied by the ninety-four AA V's in the CAR 
produces a value of $30,843,092 worth of equipment associated directly to the 
AA V's in the CAR. This generates an initial fielding cost for the CAR(AA V) of 
approximately $39.9 million as compared to the CAR(LAV) at 223.3 million. If 
the AAAV is used the CAR(AAAV) fielding cost is at least $265 million. 
3. CAR(AA V) Personnel Cost 
Life cycle lost calculation begin with the CAR(AAV's) personnel cost. 
This section will only consider the cost of the Marines required to operate and 
maintain the AA Vs in the two companies of the CAR. The following table shows 
the vehicle mix by Company and Regiment, with crews and maintenance 
personnel. 
Vehicle Qtyper Crew ~r Total per Total per 
Compan~ Vehicle Compan~ Regiment 
AAV(P) 43 3 129 258 
AAV(C) 2 3 6 12 
AAV{R) 2 5 10 20 
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The AAV(R) crewmen are both mechanics and operators whom act as a 
Recovery team. In addition their are normally another nineteen mechanics per 
company in four maintenance teams for a total of 164 additional AAV specific 
personnel per CAR Infantry Battalion. Presently, no size has been determined 
for a regimental H&S Company maintenance section but this thesis will assume 
that it is the same size as the CAR(LA V)'s and will used twenty-three 
mechanics, bringing the total personnel count to 351 Marines. Here again it will 
be assumed that they will all be enlisted Marines for cost purposes, which 
results in a personnel cost of $9,750,078. The assumption of all enlisted 
Marines is made because the AA V's will be integrated into the infantry battalion, 
(vice organized as separate companies in the CAR) whose officers will have 
responsibility for command and maintenance of the vehicles. 
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4. CAR(AA V) Maintenance Cost 
The current AAV battalions use a planning factor of $160 per hour per 
vehicle to estimate organizational maintenance costs. This is based on similar 
annual operating hours to the 250 hours used in this calculation. The result is 
that an estimated $3,760,000 will be spent annually on AAV maintenance in a 
CAR(AAV). The individual equipment upkeep cost is calculated based on 351 
Marines at $519 each. The total estimated upkeep cost is $182,169. 
The most accurate 1 st FSSG planning factors exist for the AAV because 
it has the most usage data. In the AAV case a third and fourth echelon monthly 
maintenance factor of $2,092 is used, and for SECREPs a monthly factor of 
$1,229 is used. When applied to the ninety-four AAVs of the CAR over twelve 
months, this results in costs of $2,359,776 for third and fourth echelon 
maintenance and $1,386,312 for SECREPs. This produces twenty year costs of 
$47.2 million and $27.7 million respectively. These factors also reflect the 
higher cost of operation of tracked vehicles compared to wheeled vehicles, 
which is not clearly seen at the organizational level. 
5. CAR(AAV) Ammunition Usage Cost 
Here again the ammunition calculation include the values for either a .50 
caliber machine gun or 30 mm guns to help compare the costs. One 
assumption is that all the required AAV(P) are equipped with the upgunned 
weapons station. First the constant costs are presented. 
Type Quantity Cost 
M16A2 5.56 mm Ball 31,239 6,873 
Blank 70,200 8,424 
7.62 Blank 32,000 8,640 
4 in 1 38,400 25 1728 
TOTAL $ 49,665 
The 7.62 mm ammunition supports the AAV(R) on AAV(C) vehicles. 
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The other possibility is that each AAV(P) receives a 30 mm cannon during a 











Since no ground based 30 mm gun exists, calculations were made 
assuming that allocation and use rates would be the same as those for the 25 
mm gun. Additionally, the price per round of $21 plans for the round to be 
purchased in similar quantities as 25 mm ammunition. 
6. CAR(AAV) Life Cycle Cost Summary 
For the LCC development the author uses the ammunition factor based 
on a 30 mm weapon station. 
Total Personnel Cost 
Vehicle Maintenance Cost 
Individual Equipment Cost 
Annual Ammunition Cost 






Over twenty years the LCC is $310 million to operate the CAR(AAV) 
vehicles. When combined with the cost of the existing CAR units the total LCC 
is $2,244 million of which approximately $402 million is new cost burden. With 
the CAR(AAV), the Marines achieve the same 32«»/0 force reduction in infantry, 
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but only increase cost by 15%. Additionally, the cost of the CAR(AA V) is 
approximately 5% less expensive over a twenty year period. The fielding cost is 
much less expensive than the CAR(LA V) alternative but the AAV is nearing the 
end of it's service life and will require replacement or major upgrading to allow it 
to work with the M1A1. The replacement option, the AAAV, is discussed in the 
next section. 
C. AAAV 
Much has been discussed within Marine Corps circles about the AA V 
replacement vehicle, the AAA V. When fielded sometime after 2005, it will 
provide new options for Marine Corps tactical planners. Its high speeds and 
improved armament will create a powerful complimenting armored vehicle for 
the Marine infantry and tanks. With the exception of the current M2 Bradley in 
use with the Army, it will be the only other armored vehicle capable of keeping 
pace with the M1A1 tank. Yet with all the improved capability its price tag may 
prevent it from being obtained in sufficient quantities to perform any task other 
than the over the horizon (OTH) amphibious assault. This type of assault makes 
the defense of possible landing sites much more difficult because it increases 
the uncertainty of the specific site. The unit cost estimate of between $2.5 and 
$3 million appears to be prohibitive when trying to replace the current 1200 
vehicle AAV fleet. Yet, because of it's compatibility with the M1A1, when the 
AAAV acts in the APC role, it has been considered for the CAR of the future. 
1. AAAV Compatibility with Current Forces 
A CAR(AAAV) would easily be transitioned, from a CAR(AA V) whose 
crews would already be familiar with tracked vehicle operation. It is logical to ' 
expect for mechanics and crewmen assigned to CAR's to also be assigned to 
Amphibious Assault Battalions and that they would have to receive all AAA V 
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training. The decision to place AAAV's in all the previous units where the AAV 
is currently or could be boils down to two issues when discussing the CAR. 
First, if the CAR is to be a follow-on element of the MAGTF, does it need the high 
water speed capability of the AAA V or just an APC that is compatible with the 
M1 A 1 tank? It had been alluded to in Chapter II that the CAR's lift requirement 
would prev~nt it from filling most roles during the initial amphibious assault. 
Therefore the CAR's vehicles might be used in the breakthrough and 
exploitation phase of combat operations where the primary requirement is high 
overland speed and firepower. With this line of thinking, high water speeds are 
a wasted luxury that may not be required or affordable. Yet, to maintain the 
expeditionary emphasis of the Marine Corps units, an amphibious capability 
must be retained. 
One way that a CAR could be lifted as an assault echelon force is if the 
amphibious shipping is transferred from on fleet to another (ie., Pacific fleet to 
Atlantic fleet). This would provide the required shipping assets to move the 
CAR. One side effect of this idea is, if the Marine Corps does need two CARs 
can one be designed for the follow-on echelon role? With this concept, 
theoretically one CAR would be built around AAVs or AAA Vs while the follow-on 
echelon CAR would have LA Vs. This could solve many of the problems 
associated with the CAR concept. 
2. Discussion of AAA V Procurement Cost 
The second issue confronting the CAR(AAAV) is the cost. The 
procurement cost of the AAAV is two to three times that of LA V which is already 
capable of keeping pace with the M1A1 under most conditions. The cost of 
crews and mechanics (which in numbers are planned to be roughly the same 
as current requirements) should not be expected to change much from that 
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projected for a CAR(AAV), so in this area at least the AAAV doesn't cost any 
more than what is presently available. In the area of organizational equipment 
no real assumptions can be made. Surely some of the cost associated with the 
Assault Amphibian Battalion's organizational equipment wi!! be the same 
regardless of the vehicle. How much new equipment cost is generated 
depends on, how compatible the AAAV is with the AAVs maintenance support 
equipment. This could generate some significant new costs. Here the question 
of how much those increases in equipment and maintenance cost are must be 
evaluated. Some estimates place the twenty year life cycle cost for a fleet of 
AAAV's to be over twice the cost of the present AAV's and similar to a fleet of 
LA V's. The LA V fleet has similar cost because of the requirement to field twice 
the number of vehicles to do the same mission. Additionally, if the cost of 
additional Navy shipping, which would be required to transport the LA Vs, is 
included, the LA V's become more expensive. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has developed the annual expected operating cost for both 
CAR(LAV) and CAR(AAV). It has also introduced the AAAV and discussed in 
general terms the possible cost associated with it as a future alternative vehicle. 
For comparison purposes the following table is provided: 
Current Infantry Regiment 













None of the above stated cost include the acquisition cost or the fielding cost of 
the vehicles. A detailed breakdown of this chart is provided in the appendix. 
The CAR concept attempts to replace manpower with technology and thus 
retains the fighting capability of the Marine Division. The down side to this is 
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that for a 32% force reduction, operating costs increase by about 10%. 
One important is~ue pointed out by this analysis is that despite the increased 
number of vehicles required for the CAR(LA V), annual operating cost is not less 
expensive than the CAR(AAV). This is surprising because it is generally 
excepted that wheeled vehicles are between two and three times less 
expensive tq operate when comparing fleets of equal size. It can be assumed 
that the ninety-four AA V's are below the breakpoint where there operations cost 
would exceed that of the 231 LAV's. Another contributing factor to this could be 
that the maintenance planning factors for either LA V's of AA V's are not 
accurate. When acquisition costs are factored in the CAR(AA V) is the less 
expensive alternative, at least in the short term. In the long term, the AAV is 
nearing the end of it's useful service life while the LA V is just beginning. The 
requirement to either upgrade or replace the AA V with AAA V's creates 
tremendous costs. 
The issue of upgrading the AA V fleet or at least a portion of it is been 
explored in some detail in conjunction with the AAAV program. The idea of 
replacing the engine, suspension, hull, and weapons systems has been 
discussed as a lower cost alternative to the AAAV. These changes to the AAV 
would give it road characteristics similar to the M1 A 1, better survivability with 
improved armor for the hull, and firepower capable of defeating all known 
Soviet type threats with a 30 mm gun. If the cost of these upgrades is less than 
the over $170 million acquisition cost for the LAVs this is an option worthy of 
further evaluation prior to any CAR fielding plans being implemented. One 
source estimates that the cost of a stabilized 30 mm weapon turret might be as 
low as $50,000 and places an estimate for the upgraded suspension to be 
about $22,000 (CNA 88-166,1988, p.11). 
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V. CAPABILITY COMPARISON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will deal with the issue of what capabilities the CAR would 
provide the MAGTF commander. Many analysis have been performed dealing .. 
with only one aspect of an issue and often this is the cost or economic aspect of 
that issue. Cost is only one aspect of any decision making process. Very often 
cost is the only aspect thoroughly evaluated by decision makers which can 
result in missed opportunities or less than optimal decisions. The goal of this 
chapter is to provide the broader view of issues related to the CAR. The 
previous chapter provides decision makers with a baseline cost estimate and 
this chapter will provide a baseline evaluation for CAR capabilities, thus 
providing more information for Marine decision makers. 
The goal of the CAR, as stated before, was to provide additional capabilities 
to the smaller Marine Division dictated by the force reduction. Specifically, the 
CAR was intended to increase both the tactical mobility and available firepower 
of the division's infantry. The concepts of both mobility and firepower will be 
explained and discussed in the appropriate following sections but can safely be 
assumed that both CAR(LA V) and CAR(AAV) would achieve some increase 
over the current divisional capability. It is difficult to place a dollar amount of the 
increment of additional capability provided by the CAR. Dollars buy equipment 
and equipment provides capability so the comparisons of this chapter will be of 
the capabilities of the CAR(LAV) and CAR(AAV) or more specifically, a 
comparison of LAVs to AAVs with some discussion of the AAAV. To ensure 
consistency with these comparisons, a single source for the base values has 
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been reports provided by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). CNA has 
conducted detailed reviews for the Marine Corps of both vehicles, particularly in 
the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) and Performance 
analysis in the list of references. As was stated in Chapter I, much of the CNA 
material is contained in classified reports and it was the author's goal to avoid 
using any classified data. Therefore, only sections from the reports that were 
unclassified have been applied during this analysis and a simple comparison 
scale developed to relate the information. 
1. Rating Scale 
The comparison rating has been broken into five groups or categories: 
Low (L), Below Average (BA), Average (A), Above Average (AA), High (H). 
These ratings are deSigned to give the reader a perspective of capabilities 
discussed so that mentally, a general value can be arrived at. This scale 
provides a general ranking for the vehicle's characteristics and how well it fits 
the requirements of that characteristic. In this analysis, low will be defined as a 
failure to meet a minimum level of capability under most conditions, below 
average is failure to meet the minimum level of requirements under some 
conditions, average meets all required minimum capabilities, above average 
exceeds some capabilities in some conditions, and high exceeds all 
requirements in all conditions. Use of this rating system allows the reader to 
weigh the value of that specific vehicle in a general performance characteristic. 
In all the areas where the HighlLow scale is used a standard was 
developed based on a sample data set's mean. Three CNA reports (CNA 87-
251, CNA 92-42, and CNA 93-138) were used as the source for the data 
sample. The mean or average of the sample provided the standard for the 
average (A) value. Then the sample data pOints were divided into the five 
57 
groups used in the HighlLow scale. In all the cases except the Vehicle Cone 
Index (VCI) measurement, used in the mobility analysis, the LA V was the only 
wheeled vehicle in the data set. This distorts the final evaluation to some 
degree. 
2. Compatibility with Amphibious Capabilities 
First, a general broad evaluation of the CAR's impact on the division will· 
set the stage. The present MEF-sized MAGTF can transport one regiment by 
helicopter, one regiment by AAV, and the third regiment usually has to walk or 
sometimes rides in five-ton trucks. The availability of trucking is dependent on 
the logistic requirements of the force and this creates a very high demand for 
trucks on a modern battle field. During the Persian Gulf War there simply wasn't 
enough trucking available and it became evident why World War II leaders 
described the five-ton truck as a key to the U.S. Army's success. The CAR 
solves the problem of tactically moving the third regiment on the battlefield by 
providing additional armored vehicles. 
When conducting an amphibious assault, the rapid build-up of combat 
power ashore is critical to the success of the landing. Presently, U.S. Navy 
shipping allows for two regimental sized MEB's to be transported to the battle 
area. Normally, the two MESs have the capability to land one battalion each in 
AAVs, but first for purposes of this discussion a division sized MAGTF or MEF 
will be used. This allows for comparisons at the divisions maximum potential. 
USing this line of comparison the division would be able to land three battalions 
of AAV mounted infantry in a single assault wave. If shipping was available, a 
division equipped with a CAR(AAV) could land five infantry battalions in a single 
wave. Additionally, a division equipped with AAAV's and LCAC's (Landing 
Craft Air Cushion) could land the force from over the horizon keeping the ships 
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out of range of direct fire weapons. Yet, the ability to transport a complete 
division is currently questionable, because of the limited amphibious shipping. 
Second, more realistically the initial size of the surface assault force will 
not change with the fielding of any CAR. With this in mind the CAR now 
becomes a follow-on echelon organization, not avai.lable to GCE commanders 
until approximately ten days after a beachhead has been ~stablished. Under 
this scenario the GCE commander has three less infantry battalions available to 
hold his tactical position·until the CAR could be offloaded. Even if the CAR's 
infantry was deployed in advance of its vehicles, the GCE would have less 
initial combat power because the two CAR infantry battalions are only about 
75% of the size of current battalions. From this perspective the CAR fails to add 
any capability to the GCE until ten days after the opposed landing. This 
presents a very negative picture of the CAR's impact on the division but this 
should be tempered with the understanding that the negative impact is only felt 
during an opposed amphibious assault, which has not been conducted since 
the 1950s. Looking at recent military actions (Panama, Desert Storm), there 
has been sufficient time to build up a military force (often with the assistance of 
a host nation). The rest of this chapter will discuss specific capabilities of CAR 
vehicles. The discussions will begin with mobility, the primarily concern of the 
CAR developers. 
B. MOBILITY COMPARISON 
The primary goal of the CAR concept was to increase the tactical mobility of 
the GCE. After the Persian Gulf War it became evident to the Marines that on 
modern battlefield, walking to the battle area was unacceptable. Successful 
movement in a modern battle area requires that ground units be able to rapidly 
move over vast distances to take advantage of available opportunities or to 
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economize the force. The CAR solves this problem by mounting troops in an 
armored vehicle. 
Measuring mobility or the improvement in mobility is a difficult task because 
most definitions of mobility are very arbitrary. Simply speaking, mobility is being 
movable on the battlefield which equates to the ability of troops and equipment 
to be moved. This is a very simple explanation of tactical mobility and therefore 
any increase in that ability to move is an increase level of mObility. It can safely 
be assumed that providing more infantry troops with tactical vehicles increases 
the mobility of the overall division in most situations (ie., swamps, jungles). So 
in the broad perspective the CAR, regardless of which vehicle is used, 
increases the infantry's tactical mObility. 
A more precise definition of vehicle mobility involves the interaction of the 
vehicle with the terrain or ground over which it moves (CNA 90-138, 1990, p.2). 
Several characteristics of the vehicte influence on it's ability to move over the 
ground. Some of these characteristics are track width and length, number of 
powered wheels, ground clearance, horsepower, weight, horsepower to weight 
ratio and size of the wheels. From this short list it is easy to understand why it is 
difficult to precisely measure mObility. Another, aspect of mobility is terrain, also 
having many factors which effect it including soil type and condition, vegetation, 
topographic relief, moisture in soil, soil's resistance to pressure, and climate. 
Models exist which try to represent all the interactions of these factors and some 
conclusions have been developed. First, the higher the horsepower to weight 
ratio the better the vehicles mobility in most conditions (CNA 182, 1991, p.16). 
Second, the lower the ground pressure the better the traction and thus mobility 
(CNA 87-251,1988, p.10). This analysis will specifically use the Horsepower 
per Ton ratiO, Vehicle Cone Index values, and Drawbar Pull strengths to make 
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its evaluation. 
1. Horsepower per Ton Ratio Comparison 
The first mobility measurement to be considered will be the Horsepower 
per Ton ratio. This is simply the available horsepower divided by the vehicles 





















Here the standard value from the data set calculations was 22.7 HplT ons and 
the AAV had the lowest HplT on ratio of the sample data set. 
The LA V-25 is used as a representative vehicle for the LA V(P) because 
no real data is available for the LAV(P). This initial comparison put the AAV last 
because of it's low horsepower to weight ratio. This is not surprising since the 
LA V-25 , although having less horsepower, also weighs half as much. This 
. comparison also assumes only 1000 horsepower is available from the AAA V 
2600 horsepower engine. (This is assumed based on the AAAV not operating 
the water jets while on land.) 
Even if less than half of the engines horsepower is available for land 
movement the AAAV's HplTon ratio is well above the next best vehicle. Here 
the M2 Bradley is shown to allow a comparison to be made of an APC currently 
operating with the M1A1 tanks fielded by the U.S. Army. 
2. Vehicle Cone Index (VCI) Comparison 
One useful tool for comparison is Vehicle Cone Index (VCI). This is a 
measure of the vehicles ability to make a single pass over level ground. The 
VCI can be compared to the Relative Cone Index (RCI) of the soil. If the VCI is 
higher than the RCI the vehicle is in a no go situation. Therefore the lower VCI 
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the more mobile the vehicle over the wider variety of terrain (CNA 90-138, 1990, 
p.2). RCI is a measurement of the shearing resistance of a type of soil. 
The vehicle's VCI is dependent on the soil conditions and vehicle weight 
and therefore differs with the various soil conditions. The standard value used 
here for the VCI comparison is 33, which was created from a sample of both 
wheeled al"!d tracked vehicles. It is important to note here that wheeled vehicles 
normally have higher VCls than tracked vehicles because the tires produce a 
smaller contact area with the ground. The follow table relates the vehicles VCI 
in various terrain conditions. 




























This comparison reflects the better mobility of tracked vehicles and gives 
the AA V7 a definite advantage when compared to the LA V. 
3. Drawbar Pull Comparison 
Another simple measure of mobility is drawbar pull which is the reserve 
power left in a vehicle after it uses the power required to move itself. To 
develop drawbar pull simply subtract the amount of force the soil can withstand 
before giving way from the resistance of the soil to vehicle motion. (CNA 90-
138, 1990, p.2). The next table compares the drawbar pull in pounds of the 















































With this comparison we see that the LA V is in a "no go" situation when 
pulling loads in swamp conditions. Additionally, it should come as no surprise 
that the highest horsepower vehicle, the AAAV does best in drawbar pull 
comparison. 
4. Summary of Mobility Comparison 
















In all three categories the AAA V does better than the minimum 
acceptable established standard of performance. Comparing the LA V to the 
AA V is a closer call but the tracked AAV dominates the LA V in the mobility 
characteristics. One area not evaluated above is land speed and in this area 
the wheeled LA V always does better than tracked vehicles on improved roads. 
So far the discussion has centered only on tactical land mObility. Yet, the 
Marine Corps must also consider the ship to shore mobility of the vehicles and 
the transportability of those vehicles in and around the theater of operation. 
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These issues will be briefly discussed next. 
The LA V is the only vehicle under consideration that is liftable by the 
CH53E helicopter. Granted the lift capability is only one LA V per helicopter but 
this still provides the GCE commander an additional raid or reconnaissance 
option. The LA V and AAV are both airliftable, but in limited quantities. The 
following ~ble presents accepted planning factors for the most common types 
of cargo aircraft. 











This provides an added degree of flexibility for both in theater transfers 
and allow the vehicle to get on the scene quickly if a friendly airfield is available. 
An area of vital importance to expeditionary operations is ship to shore 
movement. In this area the AAV and AAAV have the upper edge. Having the 
capability to launch itself then swim 4000 yards to the beach allows the 
amphibious vehicle to more rapidly build up combat power ashore. The AAA V 
is designed to be launched from up to twenty miles off the beach thus creating 
more options for the battlefield commander. The LA V is compatible with all 
current Navy landing craft and can be carried in the following numbers. 
LAVs per craft 










The LCAC give the LA V an Over the Horizon launch capability similar to 
that of the AAAV. Although more LA Vs than AAVs can be carried by the LCAC, 
the development of combat power ashore is still slower as the CAR's LAVs 
would have the nine man squad. One LCAC would land forty-four combat 
troops and their LA V vehicles as compared to fifty-four troops and their AA Vs, if 
the vehicles did not swim ashore. Another limiting factor in ship to shore 
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movement is the availability of LCAC. Currently, a MEB normally plans on 
having twenty-four LCACs for ship to shore movement. Additional LCACs 
would be required to lift the LAVs to the beach and this would have the domino 
effect of requiring additional shipping. 
To sum up the mobility issue, either CAR increases the mobility of the 
infantry over what is presently available. In the urban environment the LA V's 
high road speed gives it an advantage, yet in the threat description from 
Chapter I this is not the anticipated engagement scenario. In the off road 
environment the tracked options have better mobility. Additionally the 
amphibious capability of the AAV and the AAAV provide for a rapid build up of 
combat power in a hostile situation or a situation requiring entry at a location 
other than an improved faCility. This more adequately fills the expeditionary role 
of the Marine Corps operations. It also provides the flexibility of a ship born 
force capable of forward presence without actual insertion into a country. Yet 
when that insertion is directed by the President it can happen quickly without 
delay based on landing craft availability. For these reasons the CAR(AAV) is 
the better more flexible mobility enhancement option. 
C. FIREPOWER COMPARISON 
The second goal of CAR developers was to increase firepower over the 
current levels in the division. The CAR in any form has the potential to do this. 
The measure of firepower can be evaluated in many ways. A general broad 
stroke is to simply count availab!e weapons. Under the current structure an 
infantry regiment has the follOwing organic weapons in addition to the infantry's 
individual weapons (M16, M9, Squad Automatic Weapon). It should be noted 
that these weapon quantities are based on a Infantry Regiment with three 





M60E2 7.62 mm 
M2 .50 caliber 
MK19 40mm 
Dragon 
60 mm Mortar 












6 per Weapons PIt. 
6 per Weapons PIt. 
6 per Weapons Co. 
6 per Weapons Co. 
24 per Weapons Co. 
3 per Weapons PIt. 
8 per Weapons Co. 
All in Reg. Anti tank PIt. 
Most of the heavy crew served weapons are grouped into either weapons 
platoons or weapons companies, and are tasked out as the situation demands. 
The rest of the weapons in the Marine Corps inventory are tasked to support 
infantry units as necessary. Although there would be fewer M16A2s available 
in the CAR (because of its reduced size) the practice of tasking heavy and crew 
served weapon systems to units as required will not change. Additionally, the 
basic mixture of weapons available to the infantry will not change. The change 
in infantry firepower with the CAR will be in the vehicle-mounted weapons. In 
the CAR(LA V) the infantry will have direct control of the 25 mm gun mounted on 
the organic LA V 25s. The LA V 25s would provide forty-two additional weapons 
capable of defeating all known soft or thin-skinned armored vehicles. (The thin-
skinned armored vehicle is defined here as a Soviet BMP equivalent.) 
Additionally, these LAV's will provide forty-two more 7.62 mm machine guns 
that can be used to defeat infantry and unarmored vehicles. If the Marine Corps 
should buy the LA V(P) with a turret configuration mounting the .50 caliber 
machine guns, then an additional seventy-eight weapons capable of defeating 
thin-skinned armored vehicles are provided to the Ground Combat Element 
(GCE). This would be a significant increase over the current firepower in an 
infantry regiment which has eighteen .50 caliber machine guns and eighteen 
MK 19s. The weapons on the LA Vs provide an almost 200% increase in 
firepower for the regiment. 
The same basic results occur in the CAR(AA V). The present AA V with the 
upgunned weapons turret mounts a .50 caliber machine gun and a 40 mm 
automatic grenade launcher, both of which can defeat thin-skinned armored 
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vehicles. -r:-herefore, the CAR(AA V)'s APCs provide eighty-six additional anti-
armor weapons able to defeat thin-skinned targets. In the case where the 
AA V's are upgraded with 30 mm automatic cannons then the ability of the 
CAR(AAV) to defeat thin-skinned vehicles is still improved through increased 
effective range and greater potential to kill the target. This general comparison 
show that both CAR options increase the infantry'S ability to counter the thin-
skinned armor threat. The following table shows the number of additional direct 
fire guns available in a CAR not counting the TOW assets to defeat thin-skinned 
armor threats. 
Guns 
Current Infantry Regiment of 3 Battalions 36 
CAR (LAV) 
Infantry ( 2 Battalions) 24 
LAV 25 42 
LAV(P) 78 
CAR (AAV) 
Infantry ( 2 Battalions) 24 
AAV (P) 86 
1. Comparison Using Probability of Kill Values 
A more refined measurement of firepower involves the development of 
Probability of Kill or PK values. Here, firepower is defined as the effect of a 
weapon against a threat target (CNA,88-248, 1989, p.13). Under this 
evaluation of firepower, the analysts are able to measure the lethality of the 
weapon system. The development of PKs has been extensively modeled by 
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operations researchers, but in almost all cases the results are classified. This 
discussion will center on how a PK is developed and then scale the weapon's 
effectiveness using the HighlLow comparison. 
A PK factor is a measure of lethality that depends on what type of 
weapon is used, what the target is, what the target is doing, and what the firing 
system is doing. First, the type of weapon determines the penetration of the 
munition involved, the type of target that can effectively be engaged (ie., A 7.62 
mm machine gun can effectively engage troops and unarmored vehicles but not 
APCs. A simple rule of thumb with direct fire weapons is: the larger the 
projectile the larger the target it can be used against.), the type of projectile 
used, and the accuracy of the weapon. In the LA V 25 case, the weapon is a 
direct fire 25 mm automatic cannon capable of firing armor piercing rounds. 
The .50 caliber machine gun mounted on a LAV(P) is much the same as the 25 
mm except with less range, less penetrating power, and less accuracy due to it 
being unstabilized. The 30 mm of the upgraded AAV or AAAV is a longer range 
weapon with better penetrating power. 
The second aspect of the lethality factor is the target. In this analysis all 
targets will be BMP equivalents. The BMP is a lightly armored soviet APC used 
throughout the world. The targets will be considered to have only two postures 
for this evaluation. The targets will be either "exposed" or under cover in a 
defilade position. This represents the two extremes of vehicle vulnerability with 
exposed plaCing the vehicle in the most wlnerable situation. Another aspect is 
the angle at which the target presents itself to the firing weapon. Here only a 
full flanking shot will be considered. Under this Situation the vehicle presents 
the largest target area for the firing weapons gunner. 
Next, the activity of the firing weapon system must be evaluated. The 
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weapon system can be fired from a stationary protected position or while on the 
move. This Impacts on the accuracy of the firing weapon and therefore Its ability 
to hit the target. Other factors that effect the weapons accuracy are Its crew, the 
type of sights on the weapon, and how the weapon Is mounted on the firing 
platform. The height of the vehicle affects the gun's stability which has an 
Impact on accuracy. Shorter vehicles tend to be more accurate firing platforms 
(CNA 87-251,1988, p.25). In this analysis the LAVand AAV weapons will be 
considered to be firing from a stationary protected position. The LA V(P) 
weapon station is approximately 7.2 feet above the ground and the AAV(P)'s 
weapon station is 10.7 feet above the ground. 
All of these issues combine to develop a PK for each weapon at different 
ranges in different postures. The actual PK is a product of the probability of the 
weapon hitting the target or Phit and(once the round hits the target) the 
probability of that hit being a kill, whether that be catastrophic, mobility, or 
firepower (Hartman OA 4654, 1992, p.136). 
These conditions used in this analysis represent only one of many 
situations for the firing weapon to be in. The range will be divided into short 
(1000 meters or less) and long (2000 meters). With these criteria as a frame of 
reference, the following table provides for the probability of killing a target with 
\ either a .50 caliber or 30 mm gun firing a single shot. Additionally the PK value 




Short Range Long Range 
Average Below Average 
High Above Average 
When a five round burst Is used: 
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Defilade 
Short Range Long Range 
Average Low 
Above Average Average 
Exposed Defilade 
Short Range Long Range Short Range Long Range 
.50 Cal Above Average Below Average 
30 mm High Above Average 
Below Average Low 
High Above Average 
It should come.as no surprise that the 30 mm gun is more effective in all 
categories of this comparison. 
2. Stowed Kill Calculations 
One 'further calculation that can be done is an estimate of "Stowed Kills". 
A vehicles stowed kill value is the number of targets that can be destroyed with 
the available ammunition on the vehicle. This can be multiplied against the PK 
value to approximate the number of BMP equivalent targets that can be killed 









With these values we can estimate the following "Stowed Kill" values when the 
target is exposed, In this case the PK used is an average over several ranges 










A Simple calculations done to relate these estimates to the vehicle based CAR's 



























In the CAR(LA V) it is assumed that each LA Yep) is equipped with the proposed 
.50 caliber turret. The possible stowed kills combining the CAR (LA V)'s organic 
assets is 624 BMP equivalents. While the CAR(AAA V) or CAR(AAV) upgunned 
to a 30 mm weapon could be expected to kill 602 BMP equivalents. As a 
caveat, these values do not include the possible kills that could be achieved by 
the LAR company, tank battalion, and infantry antitank weapons. These 
calculations also do not consider the attrition of Marine forces from casualties 
inflicted by the enemy. 
3. Summary of Firepower Comparison 
The CAR (LA V) has the advantage of organic LA V 25s to increase its 
potential ability to kill enemy APCs. If the LA Yep) failS to receive the .50 caliber 
gun turret, the CAR(LA V) still has more potential ability to kill APCs, because of 
the organic LA V 25s, than the CAR(AA V) does using currently fielded 
equipment. One advantage of the CAR(AAV) not reflected here is the vehicle's 
existing .50 caliber gun which exists today to provide support for the infantry 
thus not requiring an upgrade. The current LAV(P) provides only a 7.62 mm 
machine gun. 
It can safely be assumed from this analysis that the added weapons of 
either platform significantly increase the automatic weapons available to the 
GCE commander. Using the currently fieldable vehicle types, the CAR(LA V) 
has the advantage over the CAR(AA V) in the potential for killing thin-skinned 
armored vehicles. One question that should be considered here is whether the 
CAR's vehicles' role will be to act as APCs or IFVs. (That is Armored Personnel 
Carriers or Infantry Fighting Vehicles.)ln the APC role, the Infantry is the primary 
weapon used to defeat the enemy and is supported by the vehicle's weapons 
(CNA 88-248, 1989, p.12). If the CAR's vehicles are to be used as IFVs, the 
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vehicles' weapons do the fighting and are supported by the infantry. In the 
LAV(P) and the AAV(P) case, it should be assumed that they will fill the APe 
role. This is not the obvious decision when evaluating the LA V 25 which has 
the capability to engage and defeat practically all known thin-skinned vehicles. 
In addition, the infantry on board is used to protect the vehicle or act as scouts. 
With this in mind, the LA V 25s of the CAR(LA V) may be used in roles other than 
direct support of the infantry. One example is using them as a screen for the 
rest of the force. This may result in their being geographically unable to support 
an infantry engagement and thus unable to apply their combat power to the 
infantry's mission. If this assumption is made, then the total possible "Stowed 
Kills" for CAR(LA V) do not change but the infantry may loose a valuable direct 
support weapon. 
D. SURVIVABILITY COMPARISON 
This issue is basically the opposition's view of lethali.ty discussed in the 
previous sections. A vehicle's survivability primarily depends on its size and 
armored protection but also on the enemy's ability to effectively use his 
weapons against the vehicle. In discussing the enemy's ability to kill LAVs or 
AA Vs, the enemy must do all the same things described in the firepower 
section. The factors that the United States forces can control are the vehicle's 
size, speed and armor. IncreaSing one often decreases another. For example, 
if new reactive armor is placed on a vehicle the vehicle size increases and 
speed decreases. 
The analysis of surVivability will primarily center on vehicle size and speed 
since armor characteristics are classified. The LA V is much smaller than the 
AAV. The LAV's main hull is just over six feet tall and twenty-one feet long. As 
the LAV exists today its road speed is in excess of sixty miles per hour. The 
,. 
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AAV is approximately eight and a half feet tall and twenty-six feet long. It is also 
more than twenty miles per hour slower than the LAV. Its larger size makes it 
easier to acquire by enemy gunners. To compensate, it also has increased 
armor protection. The AAV's slower speed makes it less capable of evading 
enemy gunners once it has been seen. The LA V, on the other hand, is fast and 
small, givin,g it better survivability under some conditions. To help understand 
this the following table provides a HighILow comparison of the chance of each 
vehicle being hit by either a Soviet type 14.5 mm machine gun or a Soviet 
30 mm gun. 
14.5 mm Short Range 
Single shot 5 Round burst 
LA V Below Average Average 













Above Average Above Average 
The AAA V could be expected to have similar characteristics to the AAV but 
with improved armor. With this simple comparison, the LA V appears to be more 
survivable. In this kind of analysis, it is difficult to measure the effect of better 
armor on survivability. Yet, if the AAV were upgraded with increased speed and 
armor, the choice would be more difficult. The current M2 Bradley, although 
large, is both fast and heavily armored, making it exceptionally survivable. 
These are the same traits that the AAAV would have, thereby making it the best 
choice for Marine operations, if it can be developed with the mObility, firepower, 
and survivability used here for a reasonable cost. 
E. SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTIC COMPARISON 
In all three areas, the expected capability of the AAAV made it the vehicle of 
choice. When evaluating only currently available vehicles, the LA V appears to 
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be the best choice for the CAR assuming that the CAR will not be used in an 
amphibious assault. This is based on on the LA V's high road speeds, excellent 
inherent firepower, and good surviVability. Additionally, the LAVis relative youth 
when compared to the AAV provides a cost incentive in hopes of having lower 
long term cost. Yet, due to the nature of Marine Corps operations discussed in 
Chapter II, mobility must be the deciding or most heavily weighted area. For this 
reason, the AAV would be the vehicle of choice. The good cross-country terrain 
capability inherent to a tracked vehicle plus the AAV's ability to swim ashore are 
the reasons for decision. In both firepower and survivability, the AA V has 
sufficient abilities to sustain it until the AAAV is available. If these current 
abilities are deemed lacking, plans are available to upgrade the AAV to levels 
of performance equal to that of the LAV. Additionally, if these upgrades can be 
performed at less cost than the acquisition of the required LA Vs, then savings to 
the Marine Corps can still be realized. Lastly, the AAV based CAR would 




The previous chapters hElVe discussed the cost and capabilities of the 
Combined Arms Regiment (CAR). The CAR concept was developed by the 
Force Structure Planning Group to prevent the Marine Corps from losing its 
combat effectiveness if the force reduction capped the Marine Corps strength at 
159,00 Marines. The objective of this paper was to establish the twenty year life 
cycle cost of the CAR options. In support of this cost estimate, Chapter II 
explained how the Marine Corps envisioned its role in the Nation's defense. 
Once that role was established the CAR's fielding cost and Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) over twenty years were estimated. A complete summary of these costs is 
found in the appendix. Last, this thesis examined the issue of what capabilities 
the CAR would bring to the Marine division. This analysis compared the various 
APC options being considered by Marine Corps planners, and presented some 
ideas about the AAA V as a future vehicle. 
The Marine Corps, since inception, has placed its future on the concept of 
being the country's rapid response force, able to respond quickly to any world 
crisis. Marine forces will need to be both flexible and mobile to fulfill the 
expeditionary role envisioned. The heavy emphasis on expeditionary forces, 
designed to fit the crisis, requires Marine Corps units that can get to the crisis 
area aboard the available shipping and then, in most cases, move themselves 
from ship to shore without the aid of improved port facilities. This requires the 
use of amphibious vehicles or landing craft capable of a quick turn around to 
the ships for multiple loadings. Once ashore the force will have to move itself 
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through a country which may have little infrastructure in the way of roads. 
The CAR, whether based on LAVs or AAVs, doesn't enhance the rapid 
movement characteristic of Marine forces to a crisis, in that the additional 
vehicles require more time to prepare and embark for transport. The CAR as it 
was envisioned would not attach its companies out to other MAGTFs but would 
have artillery and engineer units attached to it as the core of an armored 
MAGTF. The building or "task organizing" of units to fit the specific task is a 
hallmark of the Marine Corps' rapid response and expeditionary capability. 
Over the last forty years, the Marines have refined the skills required to 
effectively task organize its units to a precise art, as demonstrated in Beirut and 
Grenada. The CAR's construction as a mechanized infantry regiment does not 
lend itself to being task organized into MAGTFs below the MEB level for two 
reasons. The first reason rests with the basic CAR concept, which would have 
the CAR fight as a whole unit with other assets supporting it rather than being 
broken into pieces to support other units. The second reason is that to realize 
the full benefit of mechanized forces they must be used as a team rather than 
separate elements. This makes transporting it a much bigger and slower 
logistiCS evolution. To rapidly move the CAR, its armored vehicles will need to 
be prepositioned on shipping or at least geographically in theater. 
If the shipping is assumed to be available, then the issue for the CAR is at 
what pOint in time will it be committed to the crisis area. If the CAR is to be part 
of the assault or initial combat phases, then the AAAV or AA V based CAR is 
the only practical solution. This comes from the AAA Vs' and AA Vs' ability to 
move in the amphibious mode and rapidly build up combat power ashore. In 
the follow-on echelon phase, the LA V is the better choice. Using the CAR in the 
follow-on phase is also supported by the forecasted available shipping. 
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Further, no opposed amphibious assault against a major power has been 
conducted since the Korean War. With this understanding, the possible ten day 
wait for CAR's assets to arrive aboard MPF shipping should not be seen as a 
detriment to the CAR(LA V). The division will still retain the capability to land a 
regiment of Marines with the organic AAV or future AAAV assets in the Assault 
Amphibian Battalion. Once the beach head is established by these forces, a 
CAR(LAV) could be landed to exploit the inherent speed and firepower of the 
LAV. 
The problem for a CAR(LAV) is that transporting its 231 vehicles would 
require the construction, leasing, or purchasing of additional shipping. The 
construction or modification of shipping are long term programs that would have 
to be started now to provide adequate shipping early in the next century. The 
leasing of suitable ships requires vessels to be under a nations flag that is 
supportive of the cause for which the ships would be used. In both situations 
the problem of actually loading the ships is generated when attempting to 
transport the CAR. Also the problem of offloading the LA Vs in a country without 
suitable port facilities is still not completely solved without additionally U.S. 
Navy landing craft to support the leased or modified civilian shipping. 
B. SUMMARY OF EFFORT 
When evaluating the CAR options on purely cost considerations, the 
CAR(AAV) is the least expensive choice. Using the current AAV(P), which has 
double the troop capacity of the LA V(P), allows for some savings when. 
evaluating the other areas of cost (ie., organizational maintenance). The AAV, 
which is more expensive to maintain on an individual bases is actually cheaper 
in this case because only about half the total number of vehicles (when 
compared to LAVs) are required to move the same number of Marines. This 
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also applies to the maintenance costs where the low numbers allow the AAV to 
be maintained for less than the LA V. However, this maybe a short-sighted 
conclusion. The AAV is near the end of its service life. As the vehicle gets older 
it can be expected that maintenance costs will increase. The LAV, on the other 
hand, is basically brand new, and being wheeled could be expected to have 
lower unit maintenance costs than the AAV. Additionally, the fielding of more 
LA Vs would increase the number of vehicles in the force, which could produce 
some small cost savings. 
When evaluating the AAAV as an AAV replacement, the issue of CAR 
employment must be discussed. The AAA V should be an excellent weapon 
system for ship to shore movement. Additionally, it should have the 
compatibility required to work with the M1 A 1 tank. Primarily though, the AAAV's 
strength of high water speed can be most effectively utilized during the assault 
or initial phases of combat. If the CAR is to be used as part of the follow-on 
echelon, high water speed (which generates much of the AAAV costs) is not 
required. Once ashore, in the breakout phase, only the high land speed is 
critical. The CAR (LA V) would fulfill that requirement while a CAR(AA V) would 
require either the procurement of the AAAVs or substantial modification of the 
AAVs to achieve the same land speeds. 
Lastly, when evaluating the other capabilities provided by the CAR's 
vehicles, the result again leans to the LA V. The AAV's performance in its 
current configuration exceeds that of the LA V only in the area of mObility. The 
capability of the AAV to swim gives it a truly expeditionary flavor not found in the 
LA V. Additionally, once ashore, the AAV provides more flexibility to the GCE 
commander. "In rough terrain, the LAV will be somewhat inferior to the tracked 
vehicle." (OH 6-6, 1985, p. H-2). Additionally, the LAV Jacks some of cross-
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country capability of tracked vehicles. Yet, in other areas the LAV has superior 
performance to the current AAV. The CAR(LA V)'s organic firepower and 
survivability make it an excellent unit on the battlefield. One shortfall not 
examined in this thesis is the threat of enemy tank forces. The LA V realistically 
will not be able to successfully engage heavy armor forces, which it may face. 
As the number of enemy tanks increases, the need for a heavily armored CAR 
also increases. With the current composite armor the AAV may slightly more 
effective in this kind on combat environment. 
Although not the focus of this research, the proposed AAAV is the only 
vehicle which completely fills every requirement of the CAR. It will have the 
expeditionary capability, inherent firepower, and survivability to handle the 
future threat that must be expected by the Marine Corps. The problem here is 
that the Marine's limited funding resources may prevent the AAA V from being 
procured in sufficient quantities to fill both the present AA Bns and two CARs. 
Yet, the limited resources may also prevent the CAR(LAV) from being fielded 
which is the next best alternative. The cost to procure the required LA Vs and 
supporting shipping requirements may also be beyond the financial abilities of 
the Department of the Navy. The interim low cost alternative could be the 
CAR(AAV) with AAVs upgraded to extend the vehicles' life into the future and 
enhance its capabilities. This idea has some merit, and tests are already being 
conducted using an M2 Bradley type suspension on the AAV to increase its 
speed. Additionally, the 30 mm gun upgrade would be an extension of a 
weapon system already fielded on the LA V 25. These two upgrades would 
overcome the main shortcomings in the AAV and allow it to operate more easily 
with M1A1 tanks. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The initial line of planning within Marine Corps circles, on the CAR, is 
supported by this thesis. The CAR(LA V) is, with some exceptions, a cost 
effective solution to the problem of maintaining combat strength in a smaller 
force. It also provides a viable force option to increase the tactical mobility of 
Marine Corps ground forces. In two respects the CAR (LA V) must be 
reevaluated. First, the CAR(LAV) does not increase the Marine Corps' 
expeditionary capability since it must be used as a follow-on component of the 
force structure. If used as a breakout tool, the CAR(LA V) may not be heavy 
enough to defeat an enemy force with many tank assets. The days of massive 
Soviet armored forces may be gone, but many third world nations now have 
substantial tank forces. 
This creates the second concern about the CAR (LA V). If its shortcomings 
prevent it from performing that breakout role, then a more heavily armored 
alternative should be evaluated. The current AAV used in the Persian Gulf War 
has been upgraded with composite armor, and the AAAV will also have 
improved armor, making them more capable in armored environment. The 
proposed AAAV, or the upgraded AAV, provides a practical solution to fill this 
requirement. Evaluation of the AA V may show it to be an effective low cost 
alternative to support the CAR for many years. If the required ninety-four AAVs 
can be fielded for around $200,000 each, then this option may fit the expected 
funding constraints. Since the possible upgrades to the AAV would be less 
costly than purchasing the required LA Vs, and would fill all the requirements of 
the CAR, this alternative should be studied to determine its merits. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The CAR concept is a useful organization regardless of the size of the 
Marine Corps. The combination of tanks and mechanized infantry is a powerful 
force on any battlefield, capable of achieving great success. Unfortunately, the 
CAR's cost may prevent it from ever being fielded in each division. Even when 
considering a low cost CAR(AAV), the resulting increase to the operating 
budget of the Marine Corps may be beyond the available resources. Other 
factors may also contribute to the CAR's demise. Until additional shipping can 
be provided, there will be no clear alternative to transport any CAR to the crisis 
area. With the projected block retirement of many classes of amphibious ships 
in the late 1990s, no alternative exists to move the CAR as part of the assault 
echelon. One consideration might be to replace other equipment on board the 
ships with the CAR's vehicles. Yet, that might degrade the well rounded combat 
strength inherent to a MAGTF. Second, the Marine Corps has, over the years, 
refined its ability to task organize its units to fit the Situation to an extremely high 
level of proficiency. To be truly flexible, this pattern of task organizing must be 
continued. At the MEF level, a Marine commander already has the prerequisite 
assets within a division to form a CAR type MAGTF if the situation warrants. The 
Marine commander COUld, if the situation warranted, cross attach his Tank 
Battalion to an infantry regiment already attached to the division's Assault 
Amphibian Battalion AA V assets. That being the case, the only benefits from a 
standing CAR are additional vehicles, providing all their capabilities, plus the 
formalized structure for training. 
The proposed AAA V is the only vehicle that realistically will be able to 
conduct an opposed landing on the future battlefield. Yet, its high cost will 
prevent its procurement in numbers large enough to support both the current 
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AA 8ns and the proposed CARs. The CAR(LA V) is a suitable option until 
considered in conjunction with the requirement to obtain more ships to transport 
it, which then makes this option to costly. This leaves the CAR(AA V) using 
upgraded AAVs as the best choice. Since it must be assumed that the CAR will 
only be a follow-on unit, the high water speed of the AAAV is not required. _ 
Additionally, as the AAVs are replaced with AAAVs, a large pool of parts and 
vehicles will be available for use in the CAR. This, coupled with the expected 
low cost to upgrade the AAV's suspension and onboard weapon system, make 
it the cost effective solution. What ever the results of the force restructuring, this 




The Marine Corps has shortened many of its commonly used terms into 
acronyms that the reader may not be familiar with. This section provides a list 
of all the common acronyms used in this thesis. Additionally, if the acronym is .. 
not self explanatory, a short description or definition is provided. 
AA Bn - Assault Amphibian Battalion 
AA V7 - Assault Amphibious Vehicle which is the amphibious Armored 
Personnel Carrier which is currently in service. 
AAA - Advanced Amphibious Assault. The development program designed 
to replace the current AA V7. 
ACE - Aviation Combat Element, task organized to perform mission. 
AE - Assault Echelon 
AFOE - Assault Follow-on Echelon 
APC - Armored Personnel Carrier 
CM - Corrective Maintenance 
CE - Command Element. provides command and control for the organization 
CSSE - Combat Service Support Element, task organized to perform 
mission 
Dragon - Man portable wire guided anti tank missile. Found at the battalion 
level 
FMF - Fleet Marine Force. deployable forces of the Marine Corps. 
FY - Fiscal Year, For the Department of Defense this runs from October 1 to 
September 30. 
GCE - Ground Combat Element. task organized to perform mission 
H&S - Headquarters and Service company or battalion 
LAV - Light Armored Vehicle, all the LAV family vehicles are either in service 
or in procurement except the Personnel variant. 
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lCC - Life Cycle Cost 
MAGTF - Marine Air-Ground Task Force. A tailor made organization 
designed for rapid deployment by sea or air. It has an ACE, CE, 
CSSE, and a GCE. 
MEB - Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Reinforced regimental size 
MAGTF. 
MEF - Marine Expeditionary Force. Reinforced division size MAGTF. 
MEU - Marine Expeditionary Unit. Reinforced battalion size MAGTF. 
MK19 - The 40 mm automatic grenade launcher used at the battalion level. 
MOS - Military Occupational Specialty 
MPF - Maritime Preposition Force. Three squadrons of ships located around 
ready to respond to a crisis situation. 
M9 - 9mm pistol currently used by officers. 
M1A1 - The Main Battle Tank currently in service. 
M16A2 - Assault rifle currently in service that uses a 5.56 mm round. 
mm - millimeter. Normally used to reference ordnance sizes. 
PM - Preventive Maintenance 
OTH - Over the Horizon. 
SAW - Squad AutomatiC Weapon, a 5.56 mm automatic weapon used at the 
fireteam level. 
SECREP - Marine Corps maintenance term used to describe items like 
alternators that can be removed as a subassembly of a larger end 
item. 
SMAW - Shoulder Launched Multipurpose Weapon, an 83 mm rocket 
designed to reduce fortified positions. 
TOW - Tube Launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided anti tank missile. 
APPENDIX B 
AMMUNITION COST AND USAGE FACTORS 
TYPE COST PER ROUND USAGE RATE PER WEAPON 
5.56 MM BALL 0.22 190 
BLANK 0.12 400 
7.62 MM BLANK 0.27 4000 
41N 1 0.64 4800 
9MM BALL 0.13 100 
.50 CAL 41N 1 1.46 1500 
25 MM APDS-T 16.77 300 
HEI-T 20.94 300 
TP-T 11.61 470 
40MM WSP 20.53 5 
HE-DP 15.72 288 
HE-DP 21.49 50 
TP 12.69 528 
60MM ILLUM 37.38 40 
SMOKE WP 67.49 18 
HE 55.17 400 
81 MM ILLUM 160.13 55 
HE 90.00 400 
SMOKE WP 123.07 55 
120 MM TP-T 933.36 57 
TPCSDS-T 758.66 123 
HEAT-MP-T 3035.85 8 
30MM ESTIMATED 21.00 PER ROUND 1000 
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APPENDIX C 
LIFE CYCLE COST (LCC) . SUMMARY 
The following cost table summarizes all the cost developed in this thesis. 
All cost are presented in millions of dollars rounded to the nearest thousand. 
CONSTANT COST UNITS 
Tank BN 
Vehicle Qty 58 
Personnel Cost 25.348 
Vehicle Maint Cost 2.90 
Indiv Equip Upkeep 0.435 
Ammunition Cost 10.701 
Annual Cost 39.384 
20 Yr LCC 786 
Cost of 3rd & 4th Ech 2.7 
(over 20 ¥rs) 
Cost of SECREPs 61.1 
(over 20 yrs) 
TOTAL LCC 849.8 
TOTAL LCC of a CAR(LA V) 




























ESTIMATED FIELDING COST SUMMARY 
The following table summarizes the estimated fielding cost presented in 























EXAMPLE OF HIGHILOW CALCULATIONS 
To demonstrate the calculations used to develop the HighlLow scale the 
following example is provided. The data set for Drawbar Pull of the mobility 
criteria is uSed here as representative of the mobility calculations. First aU the 
values are averaged to develop the standard for this test characteristic. Next 
the values for each of the vehicles in the sample are averaged to provide each 
with a comparative score. Then the largest and smallest data points are 
subtracted to find the sample's range. This range is divided into five groups 
which correspond to the five rankings used by the High/Low scale. Last, the 
vehicles are sorted by their test score into the five categories of the scale. The 
accompanying spreadsheet summarizes these calculations and the final 
separation by category is provided below. In the Draw bar example the range 
was calculated to be 49010 measures. When this is divided into the five 
groups(Low,Below Average,Average,Above Average,High) the increment per 


































Note: None of the test sample vehicles fell into the Below Average group. 
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Drawbar Spreadsheet 
Hard Surface Mud 
AAV7Al 35037 31792 
AAV7A2(S) 39149 35316 
AAV7A2(F) 45250 40497 
AAAV(S) 37757 34237 
AAAV(F) 49096 43650 
APC(X) 35966 32604 
M2A2 43791 39287 
FIFV 85973 75080 
LAV 25 16756 11856 













VEHICLE AVERAGES RANGE 
AA V7 A 1 30160.8 INCREMENT 
AAV7A2(S) 33126.4 SCALE 
AAV7A2(F) 36924.6 HIGH 
AAA V(S) 32770.8 ABOVE AVERAGE 
AAAV(F) 41613.2 AVERAGE 
APC(X) 30887 BELOW AVERAGE 
M2A2 37572 LOW 
FIFV 56387.2 


































COST VS. CAPABILITY GRAPH 
The following graphs are provided to pictorially display the relationship 
between the CAR options cost and the characteristics measured in this study. 
The vertical axis are the various vehicle and CAR options listed by cost. The top 
half of the charts shows the twenty year Life Cycle Cost of the possible CAR 
options. The bottom half of the charts shows the cost of the individual vehicles 
and their capabilities. The horizontal axis shows the HighlLow Scale. To give 
the scale added meaning a breakdown by characteristic is provided. 
Additionally, the location of the icon on the chart also relates to the actual value 
that icon holds (except on the survivability chart). For example, the AAAV's cost 
is $2.5 million and the AAAV's Horsepowerrron icon is all the way to the right of 
I 
the chart, reflecting its actual value of 31. In the key box the Average/Standard 
used in this study is listed by cha~acteristic. Firepower is represented by the 
Stowed Kill calculated from the PK and weapon system evaluation in Chapter 
V. It is important to note that the CAR(LA V)'s value is the combined total 
achieved by the 25 mm and .50 caliber weapons. For the AAV a .50 caliber 
weapon station is used while the value for the 30 mm gun is showed as K*. 








CAR(AAV) H K 
2244 ' 
AAAV2.5 
LAV .730 D 
AAV.096 H 
Cost vs. Mobility Characteristics Chart 
H V K 
D V 
V D K* H 
H V 
D V 
LOW BELOW AVERAGE ABOVE HIGH 
AVERAGE AVERAGE 
HPITON 15.2 18.36 21.52 24.68 27.84 
VCI 61.4 49.12 36.84 24.56 12.28 
DRAWBAR 7377 17178 26980 36782 46584 
PULL 
KILLS 86 193 301 408 516 
AVERAGEISTANDARD 
KEY HPITON = H 22.7 
VCI =V 33 
DRAWBAR PULL = D 32293 
STOWED KILLS = K 355 (MEDIAN) 
NOTE: K* REPRESENTS THE POSSIBLE KILLS THAT A 















Cost vs. Survivability 
Y,Z W X,3,4 1 , 2 
Y,Z W X,3,4 1,2 
Y,Z W X,3,4 1,2 
Y,Z W X,3,4 1 2 
Y,Z W X,3,4 1,2 




SHORT RANGE SINGLE SHOT = W 
5 ROUND BURST = X 
LONG RANGE SINGLE SHOT = Y 









The follow inflation index values were used to develop the FY 1993 cost 
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